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THE RETURN OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING 
Susan R. Klein∗ 
Federal judicial discretion in criminal sentencing has come full circle 
over the last two hundred years.  The English practice in colonial times 
for felony offenses consisted of a determined, or fixed, sentence for every 
crime, depending upon a finding beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury of 
all of the “essential ingredients” of that crime.1  The judicial role was 
largely a ministerial one—impose that sentence mandated by the jury 
verdict.  America, on the other hand, soon switched to indeterminate 
sentencing, giving state and federal judges the authority to impose any 
sentence they chose within the very wide penalty range established by 
the legislature.2  Each judge was master of his courtroom upon receiving 
a conviction by jury verdict or guilty plea.  He held a sentencing hearing 
if he wanted one, he heard whatever evidence he felt relevant, and he 
made all of the moral, philosophical, medical, penological, and policy 
choices surrounding what particular sentence to impose upon a 
particular offender.3  There were no standards to assist or confine the 
judge in making his determination, he need not publicly state the 
reasons for his selection of a particular sentence, and his decision was 
virtually unreviewable by any higher court.4 
Judges had ceded some of this enormous discretion by the early 
1960s, as every state and the federal government permitted a parole 
board or probation agency to release a defendant after serving the 
minimum sentence imposed.  Judges nonetheless, in the words of Judge 
Marvin Frankel, possessed discretion that was “terrifying and 
intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law.”5  This 
discretion was abruptly and almost completely terminated shortly after 
                     
∗  Baker & Botts Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law at Austin. I thank 
Sam Buell, Jordan Steiker, and Kate Stith for their helpful comments.  I appreciate the 
research assistance of Ashley Storm and Marwan Elrakabawy. 
1 2 T. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 200-01 (1866) (collecting cases). 
2 See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. 
3 See generally Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972); see infra 
notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
4 The few exceptions were as follows:  (1) a sentence imposed using unconstitutional criteria, 
such as race or political viewpoint, Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); (2) a vindictive 
sentence based upon a defendant’s assertion of his constitutional right to appeal his conviction, 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); and (3) a term of years or fine so excessive compared 
to the crime that it offended the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality requirement, Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).  I will not discuss 
capital sentencing, with its vast array of constitutional restrictions, in this article. 
5 MARVIN. E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:  LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973).  Judge Frankel 
is widely regarded among scholars as the father of the modern sentencing movement. 
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Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which transferred 
power over federal criminal sentencing from district judges to the newly 
created United States Sentencing Commission.6  Once the 
Commissioners crafted the first Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
in 1987, the judge was demoted from policy-maker to fact-finder.  Rather 
than deciding which crimes were most serious, and what aggravating 
and mitigating characteristics regarding offenders and offenses she 
believed warranted a higher or lower sentence in the cases before her, 
the Commissioners made all of those decisions in advance, for every 
conceivable case, and listed the outcomes in the Manual.  The judge then 
determined whether those aggravating or mitigating facts that mattered 
to the Commissioners existed, and plugged these findings into the 
formula provided in the Manual to reveal the appropriate sentence.   
Needless to say, most federal trial court judges were not overly fond 
of this new arrangement.  After many false starts, a successful attack was 
finally launched last term in United States v. Booker.7  This was the latest of 
a line of cases, starting in 1999, that attempted to define the role of the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right in criminal sentencing.  The newly articulated 
right that emerged prior to Booker required jury fact-finding on all 
statutory matters mandating an increase in the penalty a defendant 
would otherwise receive for an offense.  Federal judges really did not 
have a horse in that race, as they previously showed no inclination to 
jealously guard their fact-finding ability from outside incursion.8  If this 
Sixth Amendment rule was extended to mandatory sentencing 
guidelines, this would shift fact-finding as to offense and offender 
characteristics from the judge to the jury.  While this would make trials 
more cumbersome and sentences slightly less uniform,9 it would not 
                     
6 The Sentencing Reform Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-38, 98 Stat. 1987 
(1984) [hereinafter SRA], was part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. 
7 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
8 There was no negative judicial reaction to United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) 
(holding that “materiality” is an element of the offense of tax fraud, and thus the Sixth 
Amendment requires that it be submitted to the jury for a beyond a reasonable doubt finding).  
Judges expect the jury to be the fact-finder unless the right is waived by both parties.  Similarly, 
there was little judicial reaction to placing large portions of the fact-finding required under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines with the Probation Department.  Judges did not look beyond the 
Presentence Investigative Report unless the defendant challenged a particular finding.  In 
finding the challenged facts, judges relied upon lax procedures, refusing to apply the Federal 
Rules of Evidence or the Confrontation Clause to the proceedings.  See United States v. Petty, 982 
F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1993) (collecting cases from circuits holding the confrontation clause 
inapplicable to sentencing proceedings). 
9 See Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal Sentencing, 2002 
SUP. CT. REV. 223, 227-28 (2003) [hereinafter Klein & Steiker, Search for Equality]. 
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affect real federal judicial discretion in sentencing—there was not much 
to protect.10   
Amazingly, two different five-member majorities of the Booker 
Court managed to reaffirm the newly articulated jury right (in what I 
will call the “merits” majority), while at the same time greatly expanding 
true federal judicial discretion in sentencing matters (in what I will call 
the “remedial” majority).  The Sixth Amendment sentencing revolution, 
as it turns out, provided perfect cover for a judicial revolt from the 
constraints of Congress and the Commission in criminal sentencing 
policy.  In Part I of this article, I will briefly recount the history of 
American criminal sentencing and the line of Sixth Amendment cases 
leading to Booker.  After analyzing the Booker and Fanfan cases, I will 
offer some educated speculation as to why Justice Ginsburg inexplicably 
joined both competing majority opinions in Booker, and what the five 
Justices writing for the remedial majority hoped to gain by their tortured 
interpretation of the Sentencing Reform Act.  I suggest that this five 
justice block11 hoped to revive judicial discretion in federal sentencing in 
the wake of what they considered the rude, disruptive, and unwise coup 
over criminal sentencing that Congress accomplished via the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 198412 and the Feeney Amendment of 2002.13  For Justice 
Breyer, the architect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the fifth 
attempt to make them advisory was the charm.14 
In Part II, I will predict, based upon sentences imposed post-Booker 
and the structure of the United States Code and the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the actual effect that Booker will have on federal 
sentencing.  We will see a sharp, perhaps temporary surge of judicial 
discretion at the trial level in sentencing, used primarily to decrease the 
                     
10 Judicial discretion in federal sentencing was reduced to departure authority for exceptional 
cases outside the Federal Sentencing Guidelines “heartland.”  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2004) (authorizing departures); United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 947 (1st 
Cir. 1993). 
11  This block composed of Justice Ginsburg plus the four dissenting Justices in the merits 
majority consisting of Justices Breyer, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, who 
also dissented in every other Sixth Amendment case leading up to Booker. 
12 SRA, supra note 6. 
13 Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today 
(“PROTECT Act”), PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 401(b), (g), (i), 117 Stat. 650, 668-69, 
671-73 (2003) (amending guidelines to increase penalties for child pornography, curb judicial 
discretion in downward departures, and tighten appellate standard of review of criminal 
sentences). 
14 I owe this count to Professor Kate Stith, in her e-mail to a Stanford Roundtable sentencing 
list-serve.  E-mail from Kate Stith, Yale Law School, to Susan R. Klein, University of Texas Law 
School (Mar. 8, 2005) (on file with author).  I had counted only three until receiving her greater 
insight. 
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length of sentences, before federal prosecutors regain some (but not all) 
of their dominance.  While there will thus be a shift in the balance of 
power from the prosecutor to the judiciary (at least until Congress 
supplants Booker by new legislation), the jury will continue to play a 
relatively minor role.   
In Part III, I will describe what I anticipate will be Booker’s effect on 
plea bargaining.  This section is based in large part upon the admittedly 
unscientific method of questioning my contacts in various U.S. 
Attorney’s and Federal Public Defender’s Offices and at federal judicial 
chambers throughout the country.  Though the substantive terms of 
bargains will shift in favor of defendants, the overall percentage of guilty 
pleas will ultimately remain quite high, and a sufficient number of 
trump cards will remain in the prosecutor’s deck (coupled with 
institutional pressures from Federal Public Defender’s Offices and the 
federal judiciary) to convince defendants to accept pleas in the vast 
majority of cases.  The shift of fact-finding responsibility that does occur 
will again flow in most cases from the prosecutor to the judge, not to the 
jury.  I conclude with a few thoughts about the likely duration of this 
new federal sentencing scheme, and what measures would actually be 
required to truly either expand the jury’s role in criminal trials or to 
more substantially shift sentencing discretion back to the judicial branch. 
I.  THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND CRIMINAL SENTENCING 
A brief history of federal criminal sentencing from the founding of 
our nation through the Court’s decision in Booker will illustrate the 
strange path by which the interplay of political institutions, social reform 
movements, and judicial desire brought about the return of judicial 
discretion in federal criminal sentencing. 
A. Early History 
The English practice in colonial times for felony offenses consisted of 
a set or determined sentence for every offense, primarily the death 
penalty or a fine which varied according to the value of the property 
stolen.15  A defendant knew from the face of the charging instrument 
precisely what sentence she would receive if convicted.16  This regime 
soon gave way in America, as early as the 1780s, to the criticism that it 
did not allow for individuation of punishment, and the belief that death 
                     
15 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential 
Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1472-77 (2001) [hereinafter King & Klein, Essential Elements]; 
Klein & Steiker, Search for Equality, supra note 9, at 227-28. 
16 2 BISHOP, supra note 1, at 200. 
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and corporal punishment were disproportionate penalties with little 
deterrent effect.17  Thus, of the twenty-two federal crimes enacted by the 
First Congress in 1790, only six required a determinate sentence of 
hanging.18  The majority of federal crimes provided a maximum period 
of imprisonment only, leaving the determination of what sentence to 
impose to the discretion of the district judge.19  The determinate sentence 
of death for felonies was likewise replaced in the states in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century with incarceration in a 
penitentiary.20  At roughly the same time as the decline of capital 
sentencing came the decline of mandatory penalties in favor of judicial 
discretion to impose any sentence within the range established by 
Congress or the state legislature.21   
This regime granted judges enormous and essentially unbridled 
authority to impose a sentence anywhere within the legislatively 
prescribed range, as sentences could not be appealed.22  Federal and 
state judges (except in those few states still assigning some role to the 
jury) possessed full discretion to consider any information about the 
offender and offense that they thought relevant and helpful in 
determining the appropriate sentence.23  Juries, on the other hand, 
played no role in federal sentencing24 and a declining role even in those 
few states practicing some form of jury sentencing.25  It is true that many 
                     
17 See, e.g., ADAM J. HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY:  PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN 
EARLY AMERICA 8-40 (1992); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM:  SOCIAL ORDER 
AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 49 (Little Brown 1971). 
18 See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, 1 
Stat. 112 (1790). 
19 See id. 
20 Hirsch, supra note 17, 8-40 (noting that Massachusetts began to rely on the penitentiary in 
1785); RONALD J. PESTRITTO, FOUNDING THE CRIMINAL LAW:  PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL 
THOUGHT IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA 52-53 (2000) (noting that Virginia shifted from death to 
imprisonment in 1796); Rothman, supra note 17. 
21 See, e.g., 1 T. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 606 (1866) (“[I]n some of our States the statutes 
fix only the maximum of punishment, leaving the court to go as low as it sees fit.”); George 
Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 913-14 (2000) (noting the broad discretion 
given to judges in sentencing during this period). 
22 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).  But see exceptions listed supra 
note 4. 
23 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949) (holding that judge could overrule jury 
recommendation of life imprisonment and impose the death penalty based upon his conclusion 
from past uncharged conduct that the defendant possessed “a morbid sexuality” and was a 
“menace to society”). 
24 See Charles O. Betas, Jury Sentencing, 2 NAT’L PAROLE AND PROBATION ASS’N J. 369 (1956). 
25 The number of jurisdictions that permitted any jury role in non-capital sentencing shrank 
to thirteen by the middle of the twentieth century.  See Comment, Consideration of Punishment by 
Juries, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 400, 401 (1949) [hereinafter Comment, Consideration of Punishment]; Note, 
Statutory Structures for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1134, 1154-55 (1960) 
[hereinafter Note, Statutory Structures].  Even in those thirteen states, the jury frequently could 
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statutes during this time period designated a higher range of allowable 
penalties (raising the minimum and maximum potential sentence) upon 
proof of some aggravating fact, such as the value of the item stolen, that 
a burglary occurred at nighttime, or that the current offense was the 
defendant’s second.26  However, while that aggravating fact had to be 
pleaded in the charging instrument and proven to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt before triggering the higher statutory range, pure 
judicial discretion reigned supreme within the wide range authorized by 
the verdict.  
The late nineteenth century brought the rehabilitation model of 
criminal sentencing to the fore—the public held the now quaint belief 
that experts in criminology and psychiatry could treat and correct 
offenders.27  Overlaying judicial discretion in sentencing an offender to 
an indeterminate sentence between the statutory minimum and some 
greater number of years up to the maximum sentence, the parole board 
entered the fray.28  These federal and state agencies considered the 
prisoner’s behavior during incarceration in determining her actual 
release date.29  This made the sentence a defendant might receive doubly 
indeterminate—she could predict neither what the judge nor what a 
later parole board might do.   
                                              
sentence for only a few of the most serious crimes, could not sentence following a guilty plea, 
and a sentence could be modified by the judge.  See, e.g., Note, Statutory Structures, supra at 1154-
55; Blevins v. People, 2 Ill. (1 Scam) 172 (1835) (recognizing that juries at common law were not 
granted the power to determine the punishment, and interpreting an 1833 statute to authorize 
jury sentencing following verdict but not following guilty pleas). 
26 See, e.g., State v. Kane, 23 N.W. 488, 490-92 (Wis. 1885) (collecting cases); Jones v. State, 63 
Ga. 141, 144 (1879) (holding that government had to aver whether a burglary took place during 
the night or day when the penalty range—both the minimum and the maximum, increased 
based upon that fact). 
27 See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:  SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS, 18-21 (1998); Fisher, supra note 21, at 1055; King & Klein, Essential 
Elements, supra note 15, at 1505-13; Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE 
L.J. 1355, 1374 (1999); Comment, Consideration of Punishment, supra note 25, at 401 n.6 (noting that 
many states practicing jury sentencing in the early nineteenth century repealed or limited jury 
sentencing as inconsistent with the notion that correcting offenders “is a problem for specialists 
in criminology and psychiatry”). 
28 Fisher, supra note 21, at 1055 (noting that six states by the end of the nineteenth century 
deprived the judge of the authority to set the sentence within the statutory minimum and 
maximum and placed authority for release dates solely with the parole board); Herbert 
Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 465, 473-74 (1961) 
(listing statutes from New York, Pennsylvania, and California that required judges to sentence 
offenders to indeterminate terms of between one year and life and allowed the parole board to 
set the release date after the minimum sentence was served). 
29 Parole hearings would consider such things as an offender’s participation in educational 
opportunities and therapy, any restitution she may have made to her victims, drug and alcohol 
treatment, relationships with the guards and other prisoners, and showings of remorse. 
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The indeterminate sentencing model began to unravel in the early 
1970s, in response to criticism that the rehabilitation model was a 
failure30 and that indeterminate sentencing resulted in unwarranted 
disparities for similarly situated defendants based on such illegitimate 
considerations as geography, race, gender, socio-economic status, and 
judicial philosophy.31  The sentencing reform movement, utilizing 
guidelines drafted by a legislature or commission to tightly cabin 
judicial discretion, was thus born at the state and federal levels.32  
Congress responded with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”), 
establishing the Federal Sentencing Commission, which in turn crafted 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”).33  These Guidelines, 
contained in the Federal Sentencing Manual, established a determinate 
sentence (within a 25% discretionary range) for each offender according 
to the offense of conviction, offender characteristics, circumstances 
surrounding the offense, and relevant conduct not accounted for by the 
indictment.34  While a federal sentence pursuant to the Guidelines was 
thus based in large measure on the offense of conviction and the 
defendant’s prior criminal history, it could be halved or doubled based 
upon such factors as whether the defendant played a leadership or 
minor role in the offense, whether a victim was injured or a weapon was 
used, the quantity of controlled substances or amount of fraud, whether 
a defendant showed remorse or committed perjury during her trial, and 
                     
30 See Klein & Steiker, Search for Equality, supra note 9, at 228, nn.14-15 (listing sources). 
31 See, eg., id at 229, nn.16-25 (collecting sources); Brief of Amicus Curiae U.S. Senate at 1-7, 
United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1999) (No. 87-7028 and No. 87-1904) (citing legislative 
history); ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING 1:3 at 9-10 (2d ed. 1991); AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE:  SENTENCING REPORT (2003); Stephen Breyer, The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 18-19 
(1988) (citing to the legislative history of the SRA). 
32 By the time Blakely invalidated the Washington Sentencing Reform Act in 2004, at least 
fourteen states had presumptive sentencing systems in place that were threatened by the Sixth 
Amendment ruling.  See Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing:  Blakely v. Washington 
Practical Implications for State Sentencing Systems, 17 FED. SENTENCING REP. 60 (2004); Anne Skove, 
National Center for State Courts, Blakely v. Washington:  Implications for State Courts, available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_SentenBlakely. pdf (July 16, 2004).  Not all 
of these regimes were determinate sentencing regimes, as some still release offenders via parole 
before their full sentence is served.  Where an offender cannot know after his sentencing hearing 
how much prison time he will actually serve, that sentence is by definition indeterminate. 
33 SRA, supra note 6.  The Sentencing Commission is codified at 28 U.S.C § 991-94 (2000) and 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000). 
34 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2004).  Judicial factfinding determines the 
defendant’s place on a 258-box sentencing grid.  The defendant’s place along the horizontal axis, 
which consists of forty-three offense level categories, is determined by selecting the appropriate 
offense level based on the offense of conviction and then adjusting upward or downward based 
upon aggravating and mitigating circumstances and relevant conduct.  The defendant’s place 
along the vertical axis, which consists of six criminal history categories, is determined by 
calculating the points from the defendant’s prior state and federal criminal convictions. 
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what related misconduct she engaged in, regardless of whether that 
misconduct was noted in the indictment or found by the jury.35  Unlike 
the determinate sentencing system in place in England and very early 
American colonial times, where all essential elements necessary to a 
particular determinate sentence were found beyond a reasonable doubt 
by a jury, all facts mandating a particular enhanced sentence under the 
Guidelines were found by the judge using a preponderance of the 
evidence standard.36  
In tandem with and even slightly prior to the advent of mandatory 
sentencing guidelines, Congress and state legislatures employed 
mandatory minimum sentences to cabin judicial discretion by limiting 
judicial opportunity to dispense leniency.37  Unlike the mandatory 
minimum penalties of the early nineteenth century, where both the 
minimum and the maximum sentences were increased based upon proof 
of the aggravating fact beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury,38 these 
statutes raised the mandatory minimum but not the statutory maximum 
and were triggered by proof of the aggravating fact by a preponderance 
of the evidence to the judge.39  On the state level, these devices 
proliferated in the latter part of the twentieth century.40  On the federal 
                     
35 Id. 
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000) (providing that a court is to make factual findings pursuant to 
the guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (2000) (providing 
that the Commissioners will promulgate guidelines for use by the sentencing court in 
determining the sentence). 
37 The overwhelming bipartisan support for the SRA had as much to do with Republican 
Senators and Representatives concerned over the perceived leniency of federal judges and the 
parole commission as it did with the Democratic senators’ and representatives’ desire to 
eliminate racial and other unwarranted disparities in sentencing.  See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, 
The Politics of Sentencing Reform:  The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 227-66 (1993).  This odd combination of interests aligned Republican 
Orrin G. Hatch with Democrat Edward M. Kennedy as co-sponsors of the SRA and co-authors 
of an amicus brief in Booker.  See Brief for the Honorable Orrin G. Hatch, Honorable Edward M. 
Kennedy, and Honorable Dianne Feinstein as Amici Curiae, United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 
738 (2004) (Nos. 04-104, 04-105). 
38 See King & Klein, Essential Elements, supra note 15, at 1474-77 nn.21-28 and accompanying 
text (describing and collecting cases). 
39 Id.; see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (a five-four decision) (holding that 
due process is not offended by statute providing for five-year mandatory minimum penalty 
based upon a judicial finding by a preponderance of the evidence of visible possession of a 
firearm, as this did not exceed the ten-year statutory maximum penalty for the underlying 
felony of aggravated assault). 
40 See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 146-47 (1996) (noting that since 1975 
mandatory minimum sentencing statutes have been one of America’s most popular innovations, 
and reporting that between 1975 and 1983, forty-nine states adopted mandatory sentencing laws 
for offenses other than murder or drunk driving); Fisher, supra note 21, at 1072-73 (establishing 
that mandatory minimum sentences were a primary catalyst in the rise of plea bargaining when 
they became popular in the twentieth century); Note, Statutory Structures, supra note 25, at 1140. 
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level, the SRA, in addition to generating the federal sentencing 
guidelines, added numerous mandatory minimum penalties to the 
United States Code.41  Some of these, like the amendments to the 
Controlled Substances Act, increased the statutory maximum and 
mandatory minimum based upon particular judicial findings (generally 
drug type and quantity).42  Others, such as the firearms provision, 
increased only the mandatory minimum based upon judicial findings 
(generally type and use of weapon).43  While the Guidelines permitted a 
federal district judge, in the rare case, to depart downwards (below the 
presumptive guidelines sentence) based upon exceptional 
circumstances,44 such statutory mandatory minima trumped the 
otherwise applicable Guidelines sentence and prevented a judge from 
departing downwards below the mandatory minimum sentence,45 unless 
the prosecutor requested such a departure based upon “substantial 
assistance,” or the defendant fit into a very narrow “safety valve” 
provision.46   
The final nail in the coffin of federal indeterminate sentencing was 
the provision of the SRA that abolished the Federal Parole Commission.  
The elimination of parole (and concomitant limit of good time credit to 
15% of a sentence) promoted “honesty in sentencing,” in that the 
                     
41 See 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CRIMINAL 
§§ 521-39 (3d ed. 2004); see also TONRY, supra note 40, at 146-47 (noting that by 1991 the United 
States had enacted twenty new mandatory minimum sentencing provisions). 
42 21 U.S.C. § 941(b) (2000) (mandatory minimum sentence of ten years to statutory 
maximum of life based upon judicial finding of five kilograms or more of cocaine; mandatory 
minimum sentence of five years to statutory maximum of forty years based upon judicial 
finding of 500 grams or more of cocaine). 
43 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) (providing for a five year mandatory minimum consecutive 
sentence for using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, a 
seven year mandatory minimum if the firearm is brandished, a ten year mandatory minimum 
sentence if the firearm is discharged, and a fifty-year mandatory minimum sentence if the 
firearm is a machinegun or destructive device). 
44 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2004) (authorizing downward departures 
where an aggravating or mitigating factor was not taken into account by the Sentencing 
Commission or was present to a degree not reflected in the Manual). 
45 Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996) (holding that mandatory minimum sentence for 
possession with intent to distribute LSD trumps the lower sentence provided for by the 
guidelines). 
46 While a judge could not sentence below the statutory minimum sua sponte, the prosecutor 
could move for a sentence below the mandatory minimum based upon substantial assistance by 
the defendant.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K (2004).  In 1994, Congress added 
a “safety valve” provision permitting a judge to sentence below the mandatory minimum in 
drug cases where a defendant is a first-time non-violent offender, without waiting for a motion 
by the government.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2004); United States v. Carpenter 142 F.3d 333, 334 
(6th Cir. 1998). 
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judicially-imposed sentence was the true and determinate sentence.47  
Absent an appellate reversal or a presidential pardon, the fixed sentence 
imposed by the district judge pursuant to the guidelines would be 
served, in full, by the offender. 
The SRA effectively eliminated judicial discretion in making the 
moral and policy choices regarding how a particular individual was to 
be sentenced.  This was accomplished by substituting a system of 
determinate sentences for the prior broad range provided for by each 
substantive offense statute, providing judges with explicit direction in 
the form of binding guidelines that prescribed the kinds and lengths of 
sentences appropriate for every class of federal offender, and ensuring 
compliance with these guidelines through appellate review.48  All 
authority that had previously been exercised by the sentencing judge 
and the parole commission was consolidated into the United States 
Sentencing Commission.  That agency made binding decisions about 
what facts regarding the offender were off limits (age, socio-economic 
status, community ties, health, and substance abuse), which facts 
concerning the manner in which an offense was committed made it more 
or less serious (amount of loss, vulnerability, defendant’s leadership or 
minimal role in the offense), which characteristics of an offender were 
relevant (prior offenses, diminished capacity), what additional 
uncharged or unconvicted acts by the defendant (obstruction of justice, 
additional drug sales) warranted an increased sentence and by what 
amount it would increase, the effect of multiple counts of conviction on 
the ultimate sentence, and whether to run sentences consecutively or 
concurrently.  The judge could not substitute her own moral judgment 
on any of these crucial issues for that of the Commission, and once she 
made the factual findings required by the Commission, she was limited 
to the largely mechanical role of calculating the Guideline sentence.  Her 
only discretion in dispensing a sentence she believes just, aside from her 
limited departure authority, was in selecting the sentence within the 
very narrow range offered by the defendant’s place on the grid.  
                     
47 Breyer, supra note 31, at 4-5 (noting that Congress’ twin goals in enacting the SRA were to 
eliminate unwarranted disparity in criminal sentencing and to ensure that convicts served the 
entire term imposed by the district judge instead of being prematurely released by the Parole 
Commission). 
48 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989); legislative history of SRA, such 
as H.R. REP. NO. 98-1030 at 75, 78, 79 (Sept. 25, 1984) reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3183, 3258, 
3261-62; Rebecca S. Henry, The Virtue in Discretion:  Ethics, Justice, and Why Judges Must Be 
“Students of the Soul,” 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 65, 90-91 (1999). 
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Needless to say, most federal trial judges were less than enamored with 
this system.49   
B. Supreme Court Precedent from 1989 to 2003 
The first direct constitutional challenge to the Guidelines was 
quickly dispatched in the 1989 case Mistretta v. United States.50  Only 
Justice Scalia opined that allowing the Sentencing Commission to 
determine the relative seriousness of each federal offense and the 
relevance and weight to assign to each offender and offense 
characteristic violated the non-delegation doctrine and principles of 
separation of powers.51  An indirect challenge to mandatory sentencing 
guidelines came ten years later in Jones v. United States52 when the Court 
began to consider the Sixth Amendment’s role53 in limiting how 
legislatures could define substantive criminal offenses and how judges 
could sentence offenders for these crimes.54  Justices Stevens, along with 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Kennedy, held in the Jones 
majority opinion that provisions of the federal carjacking statute which 
established higher penalties for the offense when it resulted in serious 
bodily injury (raising the maximum penalty from fifteen to twenty-five 
years) or death (raising the maximum penalty from twenty-five years to 
life in prison) were elements of the offense rather than sentencing 
factors, and must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Though dividing 18 U.S.C. § 2119 into three separate offenses was 
                     
49 See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27; MOLLY TREADWAY & SCOTT A. GILBERT, THE 
UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES, RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER’S 1996 
SURVEY (1997) (1997 survey concluding that more than two-thirds of federal judges wish to scrap 
the Guidelines). 
50 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines against challenges based on the non-delegation doctrine and principles of 
separation of powers). 
51 Id. at 413-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
52 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
53 In this article, I focus on the Sixth Amendment jury right triggered by the recent line of 
cases concerning the elements of substantive criminal offenses.  However, those cases equally 
protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights to proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal 
cases, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and to grand jury indictments in federal 
criminal matters, United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002). 
54 The Court first overrode a legislative label of an action as “civil,” a designation which 
would have allowed the government to circumvent constitutional criminal procedural 
guarantees entirely, in 1886.  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).  In the 1970s, the Court 
permitted a state legislature to circumvent the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ due process 
right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt by labeling a fact an “affirmative defense.”  Patterson 
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).  The application of the Sixth Amendment as a limit on 
legislative authority to define criminal offenses is more recent. 
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accomplished as a matter of statutory interpretation, this outcome was 
prodded by “constitutional doubt.”55 
This new constitutional rule crystallized the next year in Apprendi v. 
New Jersey,56 a case which again concerned not mandatory sentencing 
guidelines but two state substantive criminal statutes, one which 
imposed a ten year statutory maximum penalty for felony weapons 
offenses, and the other, a separate “hate-crime” statute, which allowed 
the trial judge to potentially double the maximum sentence based upon 
his determination, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
defendant “acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual . . . because 
of race.”57  Upon Mr. Apprendi’s plea to the weapons offense for firing 
shots into the home of an African-American family, the trial judge 
applied the enhancement and sentenced the defendant to twelve years.  
In vacating his sentence, the same five Justices that comprised the 
majority in Jones declared that “any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum [other than the fact of a 
prior conviction]58 must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”59  This significant new rule prohibited legislatures 
from “hiding” an element from a jury by labelling it a “penalty 
provision” and assigning its factual determination to a judge.  Moreover, 
a narrow reading of the majority holding preserved the Guidelines and 
was consistent with earlier Supreme Court cases analyzing the 
application of the Guidelines, so long as the sentences dictated by the 
                     
55 Jones, 526 U.S. at 243, n.6 (implicating the constitutional principle of whether “under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth 
Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a 
crime must be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt”). 
56 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (Stevens, J., writing for majority, joined by Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and 
Ginsburg JJ.) (O’Connor, J., dissenting joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Breyer, J., and Kennedy, J.). 
57 Id. at 468-69 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3 (West Supp. 2000)). 
58 The recidivism exception stemmed from United States v. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224 
(1998) (a five-four split, consisting of the four Apprendi dissenters plus Justice Thomas) 
(upholding 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), authorizing a twenty year statutory maximum penalty for alien 
re-entry if the initial deportation was for the commission of an aggravated felony, despite an 
otherwise authorized two-year statutory maximum penalty).  Though Justice Thomas has since 
renounced his decision in Almendarez-Torres, it now appears doubtful that there remains five 
Justices committed to reversing it.  See Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005) (holding 
that whether a prior burglary conviction was a “violent felony” within the meaning of the 
Armed Career Criminal Act, increasing defendant’s sentence from thirty-seven months to fifteen 
years, is closer to the findings subject to Apprendi than the prior conviction exception subject to 
Almedarez-Torres and that the rule of constitutional doubt requires that the Court limit judicial 
fact-finding on this disputed issue).  Only Justice Thomas, in a concurrence, opined that the 
government’s reading of the statute was unconstitutional and that Almendarez-Torres must be 
reversed.  Id. at 1263-64. 
59 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
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Guidelines were within the maximum sentence authorized by statute for 
the offense.60   
There was, however, much concern during oral argument in 
Apprendi that this rule might be applied to state and federal determinate 
sentencing guideline regimes.  The majority punted on the issue of 
determining the constitutionality of these guidelines in a footnote.61  
Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, supported a broader rule that would 
have designated as elements all factual findings that increase “the range 
of punishment to which the prosecution is by law entitled.”62  He 
acknowledged the potential this rule would have for turning all 
Guideline facts which enhance a penalty into elements of the offense, but 
purported to reserve the issue of whether judicial factfinding under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines was constitutional.63  However, it is quite 
clear that guideline enhancements are, using Justice Thomas’ phrase, “by 
law the basis for imposing or increasing punishment”64 and are therefore 
elements of a criminal offense which must be submitted to the jury.65  
Justice O’Connor, in a scathing dissent, accused the majority of 
undermining thirty years of sentencing reform.66  She predicted that 
                     
60 See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515 (1998) (holding that judge may 
determine drug type and quantity of drugs at sentencing hearing where the sentence imposed 
did not exceed “the maximum that the statutes permit[ted] for a cocaine—only conspiracy”); 
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam) (providing for enhanced sentence for 
acquitted conduct after judicial finding where sentence was within the statutory range provided 
for by the crime of conviction); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995) (providing an 
enhancement for uncharged drug conduct after judicial finding, where sentence is within the 
statutory sentence provided for by the crime of conviction); all cases were cited by the Court 
approvingly in Apprendi, and discussed in King & Klein, Essential Elements, supra note 15, at 1479. 
61 “The Guidelines are, of course, not before the Court.  We therefore express no view on the 
subject . . .”).  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497, n.21 (2001). 
62 Id. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
63 Id. at 522, n.11. 
64 Id. at 501.  Justice Thomas attempted to avoid overruling Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 
(1977) (holding that a state may constitutionally place on defendant the burden of proof of the 
affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which mitigates murder to manslaughter) 
by distinguishing aggravating from mitigating facts. 
65 As Nancy King and I argued in 2001, “under the analysis of the concurring opinion in 
Apprendi, each one of the myriad facts that the United States Sentencing Guidelines and other 
presumptive sentencing schemes require a judge to take into account becomes an element that 
must go to the jury.”  King & Klein, Essential Elements, supra note 15, at 1488. 
66 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 541 (O’Connor, J. dissenting).  She further argued that Apprendi 
imposed a “meaningless and formalistic” rule because it could be easily circumvented by 
legislatures increasing statutory maximum sentences.  Id.  Nancy King and I have argued 
elsewhere that the democratic process will likely prevent such wholesale avoidance of the rule, 
just as it has in the past, and that the Court has clearly signaled its intent to step in should the 
clear statement rule combined with democratic constraints fail.  See King & Klein, Essential 
Elements, supra note 15, at 1485-95 and Appendix A (examining legislative reaction to seven 
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Apprendi would invalidate the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the 
presumptive sentencing schemes, leading to “colossal” upheaval for the 
criminal justice system.67 
While the mandatory Guidelines were retained, the Apprendi 
decision significantly affected state and federal criminal law practice in 
shifting fact-finding authority from judge to jury.  Its rule affected 
charging, pleas, and trials in thousands of cases involving hundreds of 
similar state and federal statutes.68  Two types of statutes were 
invalidated by the rule in Apprendi:  “nested statutes,”69 involving core 
conduct found by a jury with increasing levels of punishment depending 
on the presence of enhancing facts found by the judge;70 and “add on” 
statutes, involving additional statutes authorizing an increased 
punishment for any crime depending on the presence of a fact found by 
the judge.71  States and Congress had enacted dozens of this first type, 
such as the primary federal controlled substance statute, which pegged 
enhanced penalties to drug quantity, and most states and the federal 
government had plenty of the second type, such as provisions 
authorizing increased penalties for any crime committed with a firearm 
or while on pretrial release.72  In either case, facts enhancing the 
maximum sentence must now be plead in the indictment and submitted 
to a jury for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.  Most state legislatures 
managed this by re-enacting these “penalty provisions” as substantive 
crimes, and thus codifying their constitutional status as element.73  
                                              
significant Supreme Court decisions allowing a change in substantive criminal law to effectuate 
a relaxation in criminal procedures). 
67 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 551 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
68 See King & Klein, Essential Elements, supra note 15, at 1492-93 and 1547-1555 (Appendices B 
and C) (compiling list of selected state and federal criminal statutes subject to Apprendi 
challenge); King & Klein, Aprés Apprendi, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 331 (2002), revised version 
available at http://www.fjc.gov/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2005) [hereinafter King & Klein, Aprés 
Apprendi] (suggesting that Apprendi has also thrown into doubt those decisions authorizing 
judges to make factual findings necessary for forfeiture and restitution awards). 
69 2  T. BISHOP, supra note 1, at 327. 
70 An example of this is the carjacking statute in Jones, where the jury had only to find that the 
defendant engaged in carjacking, leaving for judicial determination the aggravating facts of 
victim injury or death.  Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
71 Apprendi itself is an example of this type of statute. 
72 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2000) (increasing maximum sentence from twenty years to life 
based upon quantity of Schedule I or II substance or injury/death); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) 
(increasing maximum sentence by an additional five to thirty years based upon type or use of 
firearm); 18 U.S.C. § 3147 (2000) (increasing maximum sentence by an additional one to ten years 
for commission of an offense while on release). 
73 The New Jersey legislature, in response to Apprendi, re-enacted the hate-crime provision as 
a substantive statute, where the element of racial animus would be submitted to the jury.  H.R. 
1897, 209th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2000).  Likewise the Kansas legislature amended its state 
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Congress did not respond, so federal prosecutors simply began acting as 
if these penalty provisions were elements of enhanced offenses (despite 
relatively clear congressional intent that they be penalty provisions 
passed on by the court),74 charging these “elements” in indictments and 
submitting them to juries.75  Similarly, federal judicial committees 
redrafted pattern jury instructions to include these “penalty provisions” 
as elements.76  
While this decision gave prosecutors and juries more work to do (or, 
in most cases, gave defendants an extra bargaining chip during plea 
negotiations),77 it did not substantially affect judicial discretion at 
sentencing, if discretion is defined as the ability to make unconstrained 
choices regarding the appropriate penalties for the defendant’s criminal 
conduct.  This is because legislatures had already pegged the enhancing 
fact as having a particular significance in terms of number of years in 
prison.  The identity of the fact-finder may be important to the defendant 
(as she receives constitutional criminal procedural guarantees and is 
                                              
mandatory sentencing guidelines to provide that all such facts “shall be presented to a jury and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718(b)(2) (Supp. 2002). 
74 This is clear from the structure of the controlled substances act.  21 U.S.C. § 841(a), entitled 
“Unlawful acts,” prohibits possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance.  21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b), entitled “Penalties,” prescribes the sentence for violation of § 841(a) and pegs statutory 
minima and maxima upon drug type, drug quantity, prior convictions, and injury to persons.  
See also United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Existing precedent in this 
circuit states plainly that Congress did not intend drug quantity to be an element of the crime 
under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846.”). 
75 The United States Supreme Court quickly began to reverse and remand sentences 
pursuant to the federal controlled substance act where quantity findings leading to penalty 
enhancements were found by the trial judge.  See King & Klein, Aprés Apprendi, supra note 68, at 
n.8 (collecting United States Supreme Court “vacation and remand” orders on drug cases post-
Apprendi).  Circuit courts responded by requiring quantity to be treated as an element whenever 
type and quantity of the drug triggered a higher statutory sentence.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Doggett, 230 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 
2000); Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1058. 
76 See, e.g., FIFTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL (West 2002) (redrafting 
pattern jury instructions to include all enhancing facts previously found by the district court).  
The author served on the judicial committee that redrafted these instructions in the wake of 
Apprendi. 
77 Whether the Apprendi rule assists or injures criminal defendants is open to some debate.  
Criminal defense attorneys uniformly believe the rule favors their clients.  See Brief of National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Washington Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-1632) (cited by majority in Blakely). 
 Professor Stephanos Bibas argued that Apprendi actually harms criminal defendants.  See 
Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 
YALE L.J. 1097, 1131-32 (2001) (cited by Justice Breyer in his Blakely dissent).  Nancy King and I 
are convinced of just the opposite.  See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apprendi and Plea 
Bargaining, 54 STAN. L. REV. 295, 296 (2001) (cited by Scalia in Blakely majority) [hereinafter 
King & Klein, Apprendi and Plea Bargaining]. 
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protected by the Federal Rules of Evidence if they are elements decided 
by a jury), but the judge could not ignore that enhancing fact regardless 
of whether it is found by the jury or herself.  Aggravating facts shifted 
from sentencing factors to elements by the Apprendi rule must be found 
by the jury (or the defendant must admit to that fact in her guilty plea), 
but the judge has no discretion once the factual decision is made by the 
fact-finder—she must increase the sentence by a certain amount, 
regardless of whether she believes that result is just.  As previously 
mentioned, judges essentially had no discretion after the Sentencing 
Commission drafted the first Sentencing Manual in November of 1987—
all policy decision were made ex ante by the Commissioners.  The 
Guidelines eliminated all true judicial discretion and turned judges into 
fact-finders applying mechanical formulas created by others, and the 
Apprendi rule simply moved some fact-finding authority from judge to 
jury.   
There was, in fact, some hope prior to Blakely and Booker that the 
Court might be willing to pretend that mandatory guidelines were not a 
series of statutory maximum penalties subject to Apprendi’s rule, because 
they were not listed as such in the substantive criminal code.  A few 
years after Apprendi was rendered, a defendant again indirectly 
challenged the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in a case concerning 
judicial authority to find facts critical to imposing a statutorily defined 
mandatory minimum sentence.78  Not surprisingly, Apprendi had 
generated a circuit split on the issue of whether facts triggering such 
mandatory minimum sentences were subject to its element rule.79  In 
Harris v. United States, a plurality held that the fact that the defendant 
“brandished” a firearm in relation to a crime of violence or drug 
trafficking offense, triggering a seven year mandatory minimum 
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), rather than the otherwise applicable 
five year mandatory minimum for “use” of the firearm, was not an 
element to be submitted to the jury for beyond a reasonable doubt 
finding under Apprendi.80  Justice Thomas, in his concurrence in 
Apprendi, had openly called for the reversal of the similar McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania,81 an earlier five-four decision which permitted a judge to 
find the fact that triggered a mandatory minimum sentence within the 
                     
78 Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002). 
79 See Klein & Steiker, Search for Equality, supra note 9, at n.124 (collecting cases). 
80 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is described supra note 43. Though the statute is drafted to contain an 
escalating series of mandatory minima penalties but no maximum term of imprisonment, every 
circuit interpreting this provision since Apprendi has held that the unstated statutory maximum 
is life.  See Klein & Steiker, Search for Equality, supra note 9, at n.125 (collecting cases). 
81 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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statutory maximum penalty.82  Citing seventeenth century cases and 
treatises, the plurality opinion, comprised in part by the four Apprendi 
dissenters, noted the lack of historical evidence establishing that facts 
that increase a defendant’s minimum sentence but do not effect the 
maximum sentence have been treated as elements.83 
Justice Breyer, whose concurrence supplied the fifth vote needed to 
affirm Mr. Harris’ sentence, appeared to agree with the reasoning of 
Justice Thomas’ dissent in Harris.  As in his Apprendi dissent, Justice 
Thomas noted again that mandatory minimum statutes limit the jury’s 
role in exactly the same fashion as did the increased statutory maximum 
in Apprendi, by imposing mandatory higher penalties based upon facts 
not submitted for their consideration.84  That these mandatory minimum 
penalties do not also raise the statutory maximum sentence is irrelevant, 
as a defendant in the federal system actually receives the mandatory 
minimum, never higher or lower.85  Justice Breyer did not attempt to 
dispute Justice Thomas’ reasoning, noting “I cannot easily distinguish 
Apprendi v. New Jersey from this case in terms of logic.”86  However, 
because he believed “that extending Apprendi to mandatory minimums 
would have adverse practical, as well as legal, consequences” he could 
not “yet accept its rule.”87  Professor Jordan Steiker and I have argued 
elsewhere that Justice Breyer’s refusal to join Justice Thomas’ dissent 
stemmed from his realization that, if the Harris dissenters prevailed, 
there may be no plausible way to distinguish and therefore save the 
Guidelines.88  
Any hope that the Guidelines would survive were dashed two years 
later in Blakely v. Washington.89  Mr. Blakely pled to second-degree 
                     
82 Id.  In McMillan, the Supreme Court held that the imposition of a five year mandatory 
minimum penalty, based upon a judicial finding that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm 
during an aggravated assault, did not violate the Due Process Clause, at least where the penalty 
was within the ten year statutory maximum for the office of conviction.  The state court trial 
judge had ruled Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act unconstitutional and 
imposed an eleven to twenty-three-month sentence. 
83 Harris, 536 U.S. at 560-61.  While this is no doubt true, and in fact the Court cites our work 
in reaching this conclusion, we noted in Essential Elements that there is no historical evidence as 
to these types of statutes because they simply did not exist; a fact that increased the mandatory 
minimum also increased the statutory maximum.  King & Klein, Essential Elements, supra note 15. 
84 Harris, 536 U.S. at 575-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
85 Id. at 576 (citing to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2001 data file). 
86 Id. at 568-70 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). 
87 Id. 
88 Klein & Steiker, Search for Equality, supra note 9, at 255-60. 
89 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).  An earlier, less controversial case protecting the Sixth Amendment 
jury right against judicial infringement was the Court’s six-three holding, in Ring v. Arizona, that 
a defendant found guilty by a jury of first degree murder could not be sentenced to death based 
upon a judge’s additional factual finding as to one of several legislatively mandated aggravating 
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kidnapping, a Class B felony which, pursuant to the statute setting the 
sentencing range for each class of felony offense in Washington, was 
punishable by no more than ten years confinement.  Washington’s 
Sentencing Reform Act, on the other hand, specified in a separate 
statutory provision a “standard range” of forty-nine to fifty-three 
months for Blakely’s offense, a range that could not be exceeded absent a 
judicial finding of a “substantial and compelling reason” justifying the 
exceptional sentence.90  This “dueling maximum sentencing statute”91 
enumerated several potential (but not exclusive) factors that would 
support a judicial decision to depart from the presumptive range.  
Though the state recommended the presumptive sentence as part of the 
plea agreement, the trial judge, after a three day bench trial, imposed an 
exceptional sentence of ninety months based upon the statutorily 
enumerated ground of “deliberate cruelty.”92   
Mr. Blakely argued that after Apprendi v. New Jersey, the aggravating 
fact increases the penalty for his offense beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum and therefore must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  The state countered that Blakely was controlled by 
McMillan v. Pennsylvania93 and Harris v. United States,94 both of which 
allow a judge to make a factual finding—in both cases that the defendant 
had a weapon—that triggers a mandatory minimum sentence within the 
statutory maximum sentence permitted by the jury verdict or guilty plea. 
 Justice Scalia, however, writing for the same five justices that comprised 
the majority in Apprendi, held: 
[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the 
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by 
the defendant . . . .  In other words the relevant ‘statutory 
maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may 
                                              
factors.  536 U.S. 584, 587 (2002).  In a “foreshadowing” of Blakely, the Court held that “if the state 
makes an increase in the defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on a finding of fact, that 
fact—no matter how the state labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Id. at 602. 
90 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535. 
91 Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 316, 413 (2004) 
[hereinafter King & Klein, Beyond Blakely]. 
92 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2534. 
93 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
94 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (plurality opinion).  The Harris opinion was written by the four Apprendi 
dissenters plus Justice Scalia. 
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impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum 
he may impose without any additional findings.95   
The Sixth Amendment jury trial right is meant to ensure the people’s 
“control in the judiciary,”96 and thus a judge has no authority to impose 
any sentence other than that authorized by a jury finding.  Just as the 
legislature could not “hide” an element from a jury finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt by placing it in a separate statutory penalty provision, 
so a legislature could not “hide” an element and assign its determination 
to a judge by placing it in a statutory sentencing guideline.   
This case was a natural and expected outgrowth of the collision 
between the sentencing reform movement and the newly invigorated 
(but always present) Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine all 
facts essential to imposing a particular sentence.  While the sentencing 
reform movement’s grant of additional fact-finding authority to judges 
did not usurp any particular fact-finding previously engaged in by juries 
(since juries were finding only the basic elements necessary to impose a 
penalty with a wide range, and judges were using their discretion to 
select the appropriate sentence within that range), it did usurp the juries’ 
traditional pre-Guidelines role as fact-finders.  If a fact is so important to 
a legislature that its existence always mandates a higher sentence, that 
fact is functionally an element of an offense, and would have been 
recognized as such from colonial times.  There is simply no way, 
employing basic logic or a cursory knowledge of history, that the 
dissenters could have prevailed in Blakely.  Justice O’Connor’s prediction 
in her Blakely dissent that the “legacy of today’s opinion, whether 
intended or not, will be the consolidation of sentencing power in the 
State and Federal Judiciaries”97 may turn out, I believe, to have little 
truth in the states.  This is because her criticism hinges on a particular 
expected response from legislatures—a rejection of mandatory 
sentencing guidelines as too costly and a return to the good old days of 
full judicial discretion, that appears unlikely.  Instead, most states are 
responding just as they did to facts treated as elements by the Court after 
Apprendi98—by sending such facts to the jury.99  However, as we will see 
                     
95 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537 (emphasis in original). 
96 Id. at 2539. 
97 Id. at 2543 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
98 See supra note 73. 
99 See, e.g., Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind. 2005) (holding that Indiana mandatory 
sentencing guidelines allowing factual findings by a judge violates the Sixth Amendment right 
to jury trial set out in Blakely, and the remedy is not to make the guidelines advisory but to 
maintain determinate sentencing by treating aggravators as elements for submission to jury); the 
Alaska hybrid legislation expanding penalty ranges for judges and providing for jury 
consideration of certain sentencing enhancing aggravators; see Criminal Sentencing Bill Signed 
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in Part II below, her criticism finds at least a short-term accurate target in 
the federal system. 
C. United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan 
Not surprisingly, the circuit courts immediately split over the issue 
of whether Blakely applied to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.100  The 
Court reached this issue last term in the consolidated cases of United 
States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan.101  When the Court was forced 
to select between protecting its newly articulated jury right and 
protecting Justice Breyer’s primary legacy—the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines—an irreconcilable pair of majority opinions were rendered 
that attempted to do both.  Like the Washington sentencing scheme 
described in Blakely, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for a 
presumptive sentencing range, and the court may not sentence above 
that range without making specific factual findings.  Unlike the scheme 
in Blakely, where both penalty ranges were contained in statutes, these 
federal “dueling maxima” are contained first in a substantive criminal 
code and second in a Manual produced by an administrative agency.  
The Court accepted expedited certiorari at the request of the Department 
of Justice to answer two questions:  (1) whether the Sixth Amendment is 
violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the Guidelines 
based upon the sentencing judge’s determination of a fact; and (2) if 
“yes,” then whether the Guidelines as a whole is severable from the 
judicial fact-finding provisions.102 
Mr. Booker was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to 
distribute 92.5 grams of crack cocaine, which led to a 210-262 month 
sentence under the Guidelines.  At the sentencing hearing, however, the 
judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Booker 
                                              
into Law, press release for Senate Bill 56 on March 22, 2005, available at http://www. 
akrepublicans.org/therriault/24/news/ther2005032201p.php; State v. Shattuck, 689 N.W.2d 
785 (Minn. 2004) (per curiam) (imposition of an upward durational departure violated the 
appellant’s right to a jury trial under Blakely); State v. Dilts, 103 P.3d 95 (Or. 2004) (imposition of 
upward departure sentence violated defendant’s jury trial rights under Blakely); State v. Lowery, 
No. C-040157, 2005 WL 627778 (Ohio App. 2005) (holding that Blakely precludes judicial fact-
finding necessary under Ohio’s sentencing scheme to impose an enhanced penalty); State v. 
Brown, 99 P.3d 15 (Ariz. 2004) (holding that application of a statute which allowed a 
sentence of twelve and one-half years for a class two felony, rather than the  presumptive 
maximum term of five years, based on the trial court’s finding of two aggrevating factors, 
would violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to have jury decide factual issues that 
would increase his sentence). 
100 King & Klein, Beyond Blakely, supra note 91, at nn. 21-26 (describing circuit split and 
collecting cases). 
101 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). 
102 See United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 12 (2004). 
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actually possessed an additional 566 grams of crack, and he therefore 
imposed an enhanced 360 month sentence.  The Seventh Circuit reversed 
the sentence after finding that it violated Mr. Booker’s Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial on the aggravating fact.  The facts authorized by the 
jury verdict in Mr. Fanfan’s drug trafficking case led to a seventy-eight 
month sentence under the Guidelines.  At sentencing, the district judge 
found additional facts (additional quantities of cocaine and crack and 
that the defendant had been a leader) authorizing a 188-235 month 
sentence.  Like the Seventh Circuit, the trial judge found Blakely 
applicable to the Guidelines and therefore sentenced Fanfan only to the 
lower seventy-eight months, to avoid a Sixth Amendment violation.  
It looked to many scholars at that point, myself included, that the 
writing was on the wall for the Guidelines.103  In fact Justice Stevens, 
writing for the same five Apprendi and Blakely Justices, declared in the 
majority merits opinion that the Guidelines, implemented in this 
manner, violated Mr. Booker’s Sixth Amendment right to have a jury 
determine the fact which increased his otherwise applicable statutory 
maximum penalty.104  The Guidelines could not be distinguished from 
the Washington state scheme in Blakely—the Guidelines are mandatory 
and require judges to increase sentences based upon their own fact-
finding.105 
The four Apprendi and Blakely dissenters, led by Justice Breyer and 
picking up Justice Ginsburg, held in a second majority opinion that the 
remedy was not to treat these Guideline facts as elements of the offense, 
which would require that the government charge them in indictments 
and submit them to juries, but rather to recast the Guidelines as advisory 
rather than mandatory.106  Rather, the remedy was to sever 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(b)(1) (the provision making the Guidelines mandatory) and 
§ 3742(e) (the provision requiring appellate courts to review sentences 
compliance with the Guidelines) from the SRA, as well as sever any 
cross-references to those provisions.  Without the dueling sentence 
                     
103 King & Klein, Beyond Blakely, supra note 91, at 414 (arguing that the Department of Justice’s 
distinction—that the Guidelines are not “legislatively enacted” but are rather a “unique product 
of a special delegation of authority” to an independent Commission in the judicial branch”—is 
unsustainable).  Regardless of whether a legislature designed the Guidelines itself (as in Blakely), 
or first delegated them to a Commission before specifically endorsing them (as done by 
Congress), they have the force of law. 
104 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005).  Joining Justice Stevens in the majority 
merits opinion were Justices Souter, Thomas, Scalia, and Ginsburg, 
105 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), directing that the court “shall impose a sentence of a kind, 
and within the range,” established by the Guidelines) (emphasis added). 
106 Justice Breyer wrote the remedial opinion for the Court joined in part by Rehnquist, C.J., 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ.  Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756. 
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maxima contained in the United States Code and the Guidelines Manual, 
Mr. Booker’s statutory maximum penalty as authorized by the jury 
verdict is the life sentence provided by the substantive criminal 
offense.107  By severing the provision of the SRA making it binding on 
federal district judges, and capturing Justice Ginsburg’s vote for his 
remedial majority, it appeared that Justice Breyer managed to preserve 
the jury right and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines while at the same 
time greatly expanding federal judicial discretion in sentencing matters.   
So modified, the Guidelines are now advisory, the facts contained in 
the Manual are not elements, and failure to submit them to juries does 
not violate the right to a jury trial protected by the Sixth Amendment.  
Now judges must “consider” guideline ranges under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(4), but they can tailor sentences in light of the other statutory 
concerns listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Because the majority has excised 
the appellate provision requiring review of sentences for conformity 
with the Guidelines, and there is thus no longer an explicit standard of 
review in the statute, the remedial majority insists that the Court infer 
the appropriate standard of review from related statutory language.  
From here on, circuit courts will review sentences for 
“reasonableness.”108 
The two Booker majority decisions lack cohesion.  Both majority 
Justices (Justice Stevens for the merits majority and Justice Breyer for the 
remedial majority) are also the authors of the two primary dissents!  
Only Justice Ginsburg signs onto both majority opinions, and she does 
not write separately to explain.  Justice Stevens’ merits majority result, 
finding mandatory guidelines with judicial fact-finding violate the Sixth 
Amendment, is required by Apprendi/Blakely.  Moreover, his remedy—
sending all aggravators to juries for beyond reasonable doubt findings—
was the only logical one.109  Though there is some chance that Congress 
would have reacted to Justice Stevens’ dissenting remedial opinion 
(which scholars have termed “Blakelyizing” the Guidelines) by 
                     
107 In this case the relevant statutory provision is 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2000) (possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute). 
108 The majority argued that this was done for two decades with departures (see prior 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3), before the 2003 amendment changing the standard to de novo review).  They 
further argued that appellate courts review sentences for “reasonableness” on the issue of 
whether a departure is to an unreasonable degree under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3), and where there 
is no applicable Guidelines range they review for whether the sentence is “plainly 
unreasonable” under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4).  As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, this argument 
lacks merit.  It is one thing to review for reasonableness against a backdrop of specific sentencing 
ranges established under mandatory Guidelines.  Without these Guidelines, there is simply no 
baseline (besides the statutory minimum and maximum) for judging the reasonableness of any 
sentence. 
109 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 771 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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returning to pure judicial discretion uncabined by any guidelines, it 
seems much more likely to me that Congress would have permitted the 
Blakely experiment to continue on the federal level (as did the Kansas, 
Indiana, and Washington legislatures in response to Apprendi and 
Blakely).110  As I have argued elsewhere, while not optimal, it would be 
possible to submit the majority of the Guidelines’ aggravators to juries.  
Most of the problems resulting from Blakelyizing the Guidelines would 
be resolved by plea agreements (more favorable to defendants) and by 
the Commission simplifying the Guidelines.111 
The remedial majority, on the other hand, is inexplicable on its face.  
In the name of respecting Congress’ wishes (the legal standard for 
determining severance)112 and retaining mandatory guidelines, Justice 
Breyer rewrote the federal statute in a manner expressly rejected by 
Congress.  Congress considered but rejected advisory guidelines in 1984 
after determining that they had failed in the states that had tried them.113 
 No doubt Congress also intended that judges find facts, though there 
was no discussion on this point.  “Blakelyizing” the Guidelines, 
however, best implements the twin goals of requiring transparency in 
sentencing and eliminating unwarranted disparity.114  While jury fact-
finding is possible, without mandatory guidelines defendants and 
society again cannot know ex ante what characteristics about an offense 
and offender are particularly blameworthy and Congress cannot ensure 
that like defendants receive like sentences.  
The rewritten standard of review on appeal made as much sense as 
selecting a remedy for which no party had asked.  The purpose behind 
enacting the appellate review provision of the SRA was to enforce the 
                     
110 See supra notes 73 and 99. 
111 As per my Nov. 12, 2004, testimony before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (on file with 
author, the United States Sentencing Commission’s website, and on Professor Doug Berman’s 
blog, available at  http://sentencing.typepad.com) (predicting that the Court would apply Blakely 
to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and treat all aggravators as elements, and recommending 
that the Commissioners eliminate the forty-three offense levels in favor of selecting the five or 
ten most common aggravators, and permit judges to make finer gradations by increasing the 
discretionary range within each offense level from 25 to 40 percent). 
112 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987) (“[T]he unconstitutional provision 
must be severed unless the statute created in its absence is legislation that Congress would not 
have enacted.”). 
113 Brief for the United States, United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (Nos. 87-7028, 87-
1904) (citing legislative history). 
114 Relevant conduct, which Justice Breyer considers to be a linchpin of the Guidelines, could 
still constitute part of the defendant’s sentence.  However, prosecutors would have to charge 
relevant conduct in the indictment before a defendant could be sentenced for it.  Enhancements 
for conduct occurring in the course of the trial, such as perjury, obstruction, or witness 
tampering, could be punished immediately via contempt orders or charged in a subsequent 
proceeding.  See King & Klein, Beyond Blakely, supra note 91, at 416. 
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mandatory nature of the Guidelines—appellate courts were required to 
reverse all sentences imposed in contravention of those Guidelines.115  
The standard of “reasonableness” will either considerably gut the 
Guidelines or transform them back into (unconstitutional) mandatory 
guidelines.  There was no appellate review of sentences before the SRA, 
as there was no standard for determining the “right” sentence (assuming 
the sentence was within the statutory range and not selected for an 
unconstitutional reason).  Likewise, without mandatory guidelines, there 
is presently no base line for determining whether a particular sentence is 
“reasonable.”  I anticipate that all sentences within the statutory minima 
and maxima will be deemed reasonable, and so far case law proves me 
right.116  If judges attempt to give content to the standard, for example by 
determining that all sentences outside the Guideline range are 
presumptively unreasonable, or determining that certain facts should 
translate to a certain increased penalty, they risk the Court declaring 
these Guidelines “mandatory” again, transforming the content of the 
appellate review into elements of the offense that must be submitted to 
the jury.117 
Why would five Justices hold this way?  That the four-Justice 
Apprendi and Blakely minority block would wish to uphold the 
Guidelines (by dissenting from Justice Stevens merits opinion but joining 
Justice Breyer’s remedial opinion) is perfectly consistent with their 
earlier pronouncements.  They believe that nothing about the Sixth 
Amendment requires jury fact-finding as to sentencing factors, so 
Blakelyizing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is not only a terrible 
idea, but is one not required by the Constitution.  That the four Justices 
comprising the Booker remedial dissent would want to Blakelyize the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines is entirely consistent with their 
willingness to do the same thing to the Washington Sentencing 
Guidelines in Blakely.  The $64,000 question is “why did Justice Ginsburg 
defect?”  She purports to believe that the Sixth Amendment requires jury 
fact-finding of elements (the jury is, after all, a bulwark against 
government oppression), as exhibited by her joining the Apprendi, 
Blakely, and Booker merits majorities.  It may be the case that Justice 
Breyer convinced her that his enduring legacy—the Federal Sentencing 
                     
115 See 18 U.S.C. §3742(a) and (b), requiring an appellate court to reverse a sentence 
imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines, or that is 
greater or lesser than the sentence specified in the applicable guidelines range. 
116 See infra notes 181-186. 
117 There remains the fascinating issue of whether a judge-made common law of sentencing, 
even if mandatory, would be subject to the same Sixth Amendment constraints as legislatively-
enacted sentencing law. 
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Guidelines, would not survive if Blakelyized.118  This scenario leaves 
sympathy and collegiality as the motive for Justice Ginsburg to switch 
sides on the remedial portion of the opinion.  Perhaps hard cases (and 
good friends) make bad law.  Equally plausible is that Justice Ginsburg 
believes that a federal judge with discretion engaging in meaningful 
adjudication can act as the fair and neutral point of recourse for a 
defendant in a dispute with the state.  Under this due process vision of 
sentencing, mandatory guidelines contradict the core function of the 
judiciary.  If writing on a clean slate, perhaps Justice Ginsburg would 
hold that judicial sentencing discretion is constitutionally required for 
reasons quite apart from the Sixth Amendment.  Knowing that she could 
never get Justice Scalia to join such a movement, perhaps she abandoned 
her alliance-of-convenience with the Sixth Amendment camp in order to 
undo mandatory sentencing.  
Whatever managed to persuade Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer’s 
long allegiance to guidelines, particularly advisory guidelines, has been 
crystal clear. While a young attorney, then-Mr. Breyer worked for the 
Senate Judiciary Committee when Congress considered sentencing 
reform, and he worked as an author of the federal system in his role as 
chief counsel to the committee in the late 1970s.119  After becoming an 
appellate judge on the First Circuit, then-Judge Breyer was an original 
member of the United States Sentencing Commission.120  During these 
years, Mr. Breyer attempted four times to establish advisory guidelines 
from which judges may depart if they state good reasons.  The first time 
was when he assisted writing the initial draft of the Guidelines as chief 
counsel.  When Congress rejected advisory guidelines, he tried a second 
time in his role on the first Sentencing Commission.  Failing to obtain a 
majority of the seven Commissioners on this point, he tried a third time 
in a number of First Circuit decisions interpreting the Guidelines.121  His 
fourth try was joining the majority decision in Koon v. United States, 
                     
118 He argued quite strenuously (though I believe, erroneously) that the Guidelines could 
not survive if juries had to make the myriad of factual findings required.  Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
119 Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime:  Guiding Economic Crime Reform After Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, n.78 (2003); Christopher P. Carrington, The Sky Is Not 
Falling—That Which You Feel Is Merely a No. 10 Earthquake.  Blakely v. Washington:  The Supreme 
Court Sentences the American Criminal Justice System to Disaster, Bedlam, and Reform, 26 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 719, n.64 (2004). 
120 Henry, supra note 48, at 90-91. 
121 See, e.g., United States v. Menez-Colon, 15 F.3d 188, 191 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Diaz-Fillafane, 874 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1989). 
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holding that district courts should be free to depart from the Guidelines, 
subject only to abuse of discretion review.122   
Congress roughly and immediately slapped down this last attempt 
by the Court to transform the Guidelines into “advice” that a judge 
could reject through upward and downward departure authority by 
enacting the Feeney Amendment in 2003.123  This amendment was 
designed to remedy “the serious problem of downward departures from 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines by judges across the country.”124  It 
did this through various means.  First, the amendment mandated higher 
sentences for child-victim, sexual abuse, and obscenity cases.  More 
importantly, it permited federal judges to depart upwards for these 
offenses, but effectively eliminated nine specified grounds for 
downward departure,125 and prohibited judges from using their 
“residual” authority to depart downward on grounds not specified in 
the Guidelines.126  Moreover, for all federal criminal cases (not just child-
victim, sexual abuse, and obscenity cases), it conditioned the four level 
“early disposition” departure and three-level “acceptance of 
responsibility” adjustment on a motion from the government.  Judges 
who depart downward in any class of case must state the reason for the 
lower sentence with “specificity in the written order of judgment and 
commitment.”127  The amendment purported to overturn the Supreme 
Court decision in Koon by requiring circuit courts to review all 
departures in federal criminal law cases using a de novo standard, and 
limited the district court’s ability to downwardly depart on remand.  
Further, it included a mandate that the Sentencing Commission review 
all downward departures and promulgate amendments which would 
“substantially” reduce the number of downward departures, and it 
                     
122 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
123 Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today, 
(“PROTECT Act”), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 41(b)(g)(i), 117 Stat. 650, 668-69, 671-73 (popularly 
known as the Feeney Amendment).  An excellent discussion of the legislative history and 
substance of the Act can be found in Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Law, 15 FED. 
SENT. REPTR. 310 (June 2003). 
124 149 Cong. Rec. H3061 (daily ed. March 27, 2003) (statement of Rep. Feeney, the 
sponsor and author of the bill).  The amendment “put strict limitations on departures by 
allowing sentences outside the guidelines range only upon grounds specifically 
enumerated in the guidelines as proper for departure.  This would eliminate ad hoc 
departures based upon vague grounds, such as ‘general mitigating circumstances.’”  Id.  
The Feeney amendment formally became law as part of the PROTECT Act in April of 2003. 
125 These grounds include aberrant behavior, family ties, military or charitable service, 
and employment related contributions. 
126 See U.S. SENTENCING MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2004) (providing for a downward departure if 
the judge finds any other mitigating factor “of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken 
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines”). 
127 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2000). 
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prohibited the Commission from creating new downward departure 
guidelines for the next two years.  Finally and perhaps most offensively, 
it changed the composition of the Commission and imposed new 
reporting requirements.  The amendment changed the then-current law 
requiring that “at least three” of the seven non-voting members of the 
Commission be federal judges, to “no more than three” federal judges 
(and thus, conceivably, there can be a Commission with no member 
judges).  It required the Attorney General to report downward 
departures to Congress within fifteen days (including the district judge’s 
identity), or to submit a detailed report to the House and Senate 
Judiciary Committees within ninety days, setting forth the procedures by 
which the Department will ensure that all federal prosecutors oppose 
unsupported downward departure and ensure the vigorous pursuit of 
appeals. 
With a Congress intent on constricting judicial discretion in any way 
possible, despite numerous protest against mandatory minimum 
sentences, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and the Feeney 
Amendment from jurists as high ranking as the Chief Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court,128 it is no wonder that the Court accepted 
the opportunity presented by Booker to strike back.   
II. FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCING AFTER BOOKER 
In the short term, judicial discretion is hugely increased as appellate 
courts reverse and remand all sentences still on direct appeal after Booker 
and trial judges impose post-Booker sentences in the absence of 
mandatory sentencing guidelines.  I will first discuss what parts of the 
SRA and the Feeney Amendment survive Booker, then review how trial 
courts are presently reacting to their new grant of authority, and finally 
discuss the extent to which this discretion can be reigned in by appellate 
review. 
                     
128 See, e.g., The American Bar Association, Justice Kennedy’s Commission Final Report, 
issued June 23, 2004, available at http://www.abanet.org/index.cfm; Rhonda McMillion, 
ABA Supports Push to Restore Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 90 A.B.A.J. 62 (Jan. 2004) 
(noting speech by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy stating that “prison sentences are too long, 
mandatory minimum sentences should be repealed, and sentencing guidelines should be 
reconsidered”); Gina Holland, Justice Applauds Bucking Sentencing Law, at 
http://news.findlaw.com (last visited March 17, 2004) (quoting Justice Kennedy’s 
statement that courts should not have to “follow, blindly, these unjust guidelines”); Letters 
to Congress from Sentencing Commissioners, Judicial Conference, and Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist in opposition to Feeney Amendment, reprinted in 15 FED. 
SENTENCING REPORTER 471 (letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Senator Patrick Leahy 
warned that the amendment, “if enacted, would do serious harm to the basic structure of 
the sentencing guideline system and would seriously impair the ability of courts to impose 
just and reasonable sentences”). 
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The remedial majority held that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), making the 
Guidelines mandatory,129 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), requiring appellate 
courts to review sentences for compliance with the Guidelines,130 are 
severed and excised from the SRA as are all cross-references to the two 
severed provisions.131  So modified, the Guidelines are “effectively 
advisory” and thus judicial fact-finding and employment of the policy 
decisions contained in the guidelines do not violate a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial.  Federal district judges must now 
“consider” the Commissioners’ preferences as set out in the guideline 
ranges pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), but can tailor sentences in light 
of the other statutory concerns as well.  These statutory concerns, listed 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), include imposing a sentence “not greater than 
necessary, to comply with the purposes set in [the Sentencing Reform 
Act.]”132  These purposes are:   
the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
history and characteristics of the defendant, . . . the need 
for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of 
the offense, to promote respect for the law, . . . to 
provide just punishment for the offense . . . to afford 
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, . . . to protect 
the public from further crimes of the defendant; . . . to 
provide the defendant with needed educational or 
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner, . . . to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants 
with similar records . . . and . . . to provide restitution to 
any victims of the offense.133   
This authority, coupled with the admonition in 18 U.S.C. § 3661 that “no 
limitations shall be placed on the information concerning the 
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense 
which a court of the United States may receive and consider for 
                     
129 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000) (providing that the court “shall impose a sentence of the kind, 
and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4)”).  Subsection (a)(4) directs the judge to 
apply the guidelines in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced. 
130 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (West Supp. 2004) (providing that the appellate court shall review the 
record to determine whether the sentence was “imposed as a result of an incorrect application of 
the sentencing guidelines”). 
131 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005). 
132 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (emphasis added).  Professor Berman argues that what he labels 
this “parsimony provision” requires the judge to impose a sentence below the guidelines range 
because guidelines sentences are not parsimonious.  See  Sentencing Law and Policy (Jan. 12, 
2005), at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy. 
133 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3553(a)(1)-(7) (West Supp. 2004). 
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purposes of imposing an appropriate sentence,”134 allow trial judges free 
reign in gathering information and making discretionary sentencing 
decisions.  
A quick glance at the above list of appropriate statutory concerns in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which includes a smorgasbord of deterrence, 
rehabilitative, and retributive theories of justice, should alert the reader 
to the possibility of adequately justifying any conceivable sentence the 
judge might wish to impose.  While federal judges were theoretically 
considering all of these factors prior to Booker, in reality the range 
provided for by the Guidelines Manual trumped alternatives the judge 
might prefer.  In fact, many of the Commissioners’ wishes, as reflected in 
the Guidelines, directly contradicted statutory factors that judges were 
supposed to be considering.  For example, much of the defendant’s 
history and medical needs were expressly prohibited by the Guidelines 
as grounds for reaching a particular sentence.135  The only mandatory 
sentences remaining after Booker are the mandatory minima enacted in 
the Crime Control Act that contained the SRA.  So long as Harris v. 
United States136 remains good law, judges cannot impose a sentence 
lower than a statutory minimum—everything else is fair game.   
Though the remedial majority in Booker did not discuss the Feeney 
Amendment, its logic should apply to render all mandatory sentencing 
provisions either unconstitutional or advisory.  For example, as part of 
the Feeney Amendment, Congress added § 3553(b)(2), limiting 
downward departures in child sex offense cases to those grounds 
specifically identified as permissible grounds of downward departures 
in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual.  Will this prevent a judge from 
granting a downward departure based upon a defendant’s age, his 
educational skills, substance abuse problems, aberrant behavior, family 
ties, or military service, all of which have been declared off-limits by the 
Commissioners?137  If the Guidelines are now truly advisory, if seems to 
me that a judge in a child sex offense case should have the same 
authority to consider and then reject the Commissioner’s policy choices 
regarding departures as in any other type of case.  Similarly, the Feeney 
Amendment purports to restrict a judge from subtracting a third point 
from a defendant’s base offense level for exceptional acceptance of 
responsibility (the ordinary award for pleading guilty and accepting 
                     
134 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000). 
135 See infra note 137. 
136 See supra note 78. 
137 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.2 (aberrant behavior), § 5H1.6 (family ties 
and responsibilities), § 5H1.11 (military or charitable services), § 5H1.10 (socio-economic status), 
and § 5H1.12 (lack of guidance as a youth), all declared to generally be impermissible grounds 
for a downward departure. 
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responsibility for one’s crime is a two-point deduction) except upon 
motion from the government.  Likewise, the Guidelines allow a judge to 
grant a four level decrease for early dispositions program, again only 
upon motion from the government.  If the Guidelines are advisory, then 
a judge could deduct the three points (or award any quantity of decrease 
she wishes) regardless of the government’s request.  Likewise, the judge 
could decide that the statutory sentencing factor in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) 
advocating the elimination of disparity warrants granting a four-level 
decrease to all defendants, even if they are not lucky enough to be 
charged in a fast track jurisdiction. 
The same argument flows regarding substantial assistance and 
relevant conduct, as well as collateral issue such as criminal forfeiture 
and mandatory restitution.138  Prior to Booker, a judge could grant a 
                     
138 While beyond the scope of this article, criminal forfeiture and mandatory restitution 
should also be subject to the Apprendi/Booker rule, despite Justice Breyer’s unexplained 
declaration in Booker dicta that 18 U.S.C. § 3554, requiring criminal forfeiture in certain 
classes of cases, survives.  Mandatory criminal forfeiture pursuant to the RICO statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 1963,  requires that the judge order forfeiture of any property constituting, or 
derived from, any proceeds obtained from racketeering activity.  The factual finding that 
the property is proceeds is made by a judge, not a jury. Likewise, 21 U.S.C. § 853 requires 
forfeiture of proceeds and property used to facilitate a drug offense, and 18 U.S.C. § 982 
requires forfeiture of money involved in money laundering.  However, the mere inclusion 
of “forfeiture” as part of the penalty for a criminal offense does not authorize forfeiture of a 
defendant’s estate as the penalty for committing his crime—the statutory maximum penalty 
is not everything the defendant owns.  Rather, these statutes authorize the forfeiture only of 
those assets that meet certain criteria.  This is similar to old larceny statutes that 
conditioned the amount of the fine on amount of loss sustained or value of property stolen. 
 Since these facts must be established before the higher punishment is authorized, they 
should be elements after Apprendi and Booker.  This especially true where forfeiture is 
mandatory, and the judge has no discretion to refuse to impose it.  Nancy King and I first 
took this position in Essential Elements, supra note 15 at n.51, and expanded upon it in King 
& Klein, Beyond Blakely, supra note 91.  However, case law thus far is primarily to the 
contrary.  See., e.g., United States v. Messino, 382 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2004) (drug forfeiture 
findings of quantity and nexus are not elements of the offense after Blakely because there is 
no statutory maximum penalty); United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 101 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(requesting additional briefing on whether Blakely disrupts RICO criminal forfeiture). 
 The Mandatory Victim’s Restitution Act is likewise now rendered advisory, or the 
facts necessary to establish the appropriate imposition of restitution must be submitted to a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  In 1996, Congress enacted the Mandatory Victim’s 
Restitution Act, which requires that the court order restitution to the victim of an offense, 
after making necessary factual findings as to the amount of loss, any medical expenses, and 
lost income resulting from the defendant’s crime.  18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2000).  It seems to me 
that these factual findings increase the statutory maximum penalty for the offense from no 
restitution to a higher amount, and that therefore these facts should be submitted to a jury 
for a beyond a reasonable doubt finding (or the restitution should be interpreted as 
discretionary).  Again although there is a split over whether restitution constitutes 
punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause, most Circuit cases have taken the 
position that the Apprendi/Blakely/Booker line of cases do not apply because first, restitution 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 3 [2005], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss3/4
2005] Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing 723 
defendant a downward adjustment to their sentence for substantial 
assistance to law enforcement only upon motion from the government.139 
 If the guidelines are advisory, it seems to me that a judge could grant a 
downward departure for substantial assistance if doing so furthers any 
of the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), regardless of whether the 
prosecutor moves for the departure.  This gives judges much more 
discretion in sentencing, at least up to the point where they run into a 
mandatory minimum penalty.  If the Harris holding that mandatory 
minimum penalties are not covered by Apprendi/Blakely remains good 
law, then the judge cannot go below such a statutory mandatory 
minimum sentence based upon substantial assistance.  This is because of 
an independent statute providing that a judge can sentence below a 
mandatory minimum based upon substantial assistance only upon the 
government’s motion.140  This statute providing “get out of jail free” 
cards solely to prosecutors probably does not run afoul of the 
Apprendi/Blakely rule.  
Prior to Booker, judges were compelled to impose increased 
sentences based upon their finding of “relevant conduct.”141  Relevant 
conduct includes all foreseeable acts of co-conspirators and any other 
criminal conduct that was part of the same “course of conduct or 
common scheme or plan” as the offense of conviction.142  Under this 
scheme, prosecutors could force judges to sentence a defendant for 
conduct that was never charged, or even for conduct for which the 
defendant was acquitted.143  Now that the guidelines are advisory, 
                                              
is not punishment at all, and second, the restitution statute contains no maximum penalty. 
See, e.g., United States v. Wooten, 377 F.3d 1134  (10th Cir. 2004) (restitution under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3663A did not violate Blakely as the defendant did not contend that the forfeiture order 
exceeded the value of the damaged property).  See also United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131 
(3d Cir. 2002) (Apprendi does not apply to the Mandatory Victim’s Restitution Act because 
18 U.S.C. § 3663A has no statutory maximum amount), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 619 (2002).  
But see United States v. LaMere, No. 03-30479, 2004 WL 1737916 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming 
defendant’s conviction but vacating restitution portion of his sentence and ordering 
mandate held until the resolution of the application of Blakely). 
139 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004). 
140 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000) (providing that the court “may impose a sentence below 
a level established by statute as a minimum sentence” only “upon motion of the 
Government”). 
141 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2004) (providing that judges shall 
sentence for relevant conduct). 
142 Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) provides that relevant conduct includes acts of co-conspirators, and 
§ 1B1.3(a)(2) provides that relevant conduct includes counts that would group under 
§ 3D1.3(d) and are part of the same course of conduct. 
143 United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam) (upholding guidelines 
provision for enhancement for acquitted conduct within the statutory maximum sentence 
for the crime of conviction); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995) (Double Jeopardy 
Clause not offended by guideline requirement that judge improse enhancement for 
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judges can ignore relevant conduct if they choose, giving them one more 
means to sentence below a guidelines recommendation.144 
Federal judges have, for the most part, hated the Guidelines since 
the first Manual was published, in equal measure because the Guidelines 
effectively eliminated their discretion and because they were widely 
perceived as draconian.  Trial judges appear to be taking their new-
found authority to heart, and the majority of these cases favor 
defendants with lower sentences.  Judges are now sentencing in two 
classes of cases:145  “pipeline” cases that were still on direct appeal when 
Booker was rendered on January 25, 2005,146 and new sentencing hearings 
occurring for the first time post-Booker.  As to the first class of cases, 
almost all circuit courts are reversing and remanding the vast majority of 
pre-Booker sentences, finding harmful and plain error below.147  Even the 
                                              
uncharged drug conduct proven by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing, as so 
long as the sentence was within the statutory maximum for the crime of conviction). 
144 See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 771 (2005) (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
145 Sentences already final before Booker have no hope for reversals, as Booker will not be 
retroactive to cases on collateral review.  See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding no 
relief available under § 2255 on basis of a “new” rule of criminal procedure announced after the 
prisoner’s conviction became final); Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004) (holding that 
Ring’s rule requiring jury determination of aggravating factors was not retroactive because it 
was a new rule that did not fit into one of the exceptions for collateral review); In re Anderson, 
396 F.3d. 1336 (11th Cir. 2005) (Judge Tjoflat) (denying second habeas petition because United 
States Supreme Court did not make Blakely or Booker retroactive on collateral review).  But see 
Note, Rethinking Retroactivity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1642 (2005) (arguing that the Booker line of cases 
should be retroactive to cases pending on collateral review). 
 Likewise, where a defendant has waived her Apprendi rights in her plea agreement, these 
waivers will be upheld on appeal.  See, e.g., United States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d. 1330 (11th Cir. 
2005) (holding that appeal waiver is valid even where agreement contains exception for sentence 
above statutory maximum, as “statutory maximum” in plea agreement meant the highest 
penalty listed in the United States Code, not the new “statutory maximum” as defined by 
Booker). 
146 The Booker majority, citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), held that the new Sixth 
Amendment rule would be applied to all cases pending on direct review.  In the few months 
since Booker was rendered, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and 
remanded in light of Booker in over four-hundred cases.  See Today’s SCOTUS action 
Sentencing Law & Policy, http://sentency.typepad.com (last visited April 21. 2005).  The entry 
reports that nearly 450 cases were remanded to lower courts in light of the Court’s ruling in 
the Booker case. 
147 Pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 52, when a defendant fails to object to an error, it is recognized 
only if plain.  See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002). 
[B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there 
must be (1) ‘error,’ (2) that is ‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affect[s] substantial 
rights.’  If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise 
its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously 
affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 
Id. (citations omitted).  Where a defendant does object to an error, it is recognized unless 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Fourth Circuit, one of our nation’s most conservative, reversed a 
sentence under plain error review.148  Judge Wilkins found that where 
the jury verdict supported a six to twelve month sentence for bankruptcy 
fraud but the judge imposed a forty-one to fifty-one month sentence 
based upon additional factual findings regarding amount of loss, more 
than minimal planning, abuse of a position of trust, and obstruction of 
justice, there was plain error that affected the defendant’s substantial 
rights and that it would be a miscarriage of justice to fail to reverse and 
remand.149 
More importantly, those federal judges imposing criminal sentences 
post-Booker are almost uniformly employing their vast discretion in 
reaching their decisions.  A few of the many available examples of 
judges calculating the Guidelines sentence150 and then sentencing 
                     
148 United States v. Hughes, 396 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2005).  The author of this opinion, Chief 
Judge William W. Wilkins, was one of the original U.S. Sentencing Commissioners. 
149 See also United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d. 68 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Boone, No. 04-2877, 2005 WL 290204 (2d Cir. Feb. 07, 2005); United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d. 
103 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. D’Oliveira, No. 04-2736, 2005 WL 647658 (2d Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Mortimer, No. 03-4174, 2005 WL 318650 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Washington, 398 F.3d. 306 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hughes, 396 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d. 540 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d. 516 
(6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Milan, 398 F.3d. 445 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Harris, 397 
F.3d. 404 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d. 369 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Davis, 397 F.3d. 340 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Re, No. 03-2089, 2005 WL 647715 (7th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d. 1090 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Fox, 393 F.3d. 1018 
(8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Coffey, 395 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Adams, No. 
03-2137, 2005 WL 646370 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Ameline, 400 F.3d. 646, (9th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Seibert, No. 04-10171, 2005 WL 281469, (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Ruiz-
Alonso, 397 F.3d. 815 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lynch, 397 F.3d. 1270 (10th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d. 1291 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garcia, No. 03-10350, 
2005 WL 646342 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Reese, 397 F.3d. 1337 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 A much smaller number of sentences in pipeline cases are being affirmed based upon plain 
error analysis.  See United States v. Bruce, 396 F.3d. 697, 720 (6th Cir. 2005); Rucker v. United 
States, No. 2:04-CV-00914PGC, 2005 WL 331336 at *10 (D. Utah 2005); United States v. 
Rodriguez, 398 F.3d. 1291 (11th Cir. 2005).  It is only the Fifth and D.C. Circuits that stringently 
require a defendant to establish prejudice before obtaining a remand for new sentencing.  See 
United States v. Infante, No. 02-50665, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 4571 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Smith, No. 03-3087, 2005 WL 627077 (D.C. 2005) (per curiam). 
150 On January 21, 2005, Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, the chair of the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, and Judge Sim Lake, the chair of the Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial 
Conference of the U.S., sent a memorandum to all U.S. judges reminding them of the 
“importance of continuing to submit sentencing documents to the Sentencing Commission in 
accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 994(w).”  See Memorandum from Judge 
Ricardo H. Hinojosa and Judge Sim Lake, to all Federal Judges, available at 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/ussc_documentation_re
quest.pdf (concerning specific sentencing documents such as the Presentence Report, 
information about offender and offense made relevant by the guidelines).  It further reminded 
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otherwise shortly after Booker should suffice to make this point.151  Many 
judges, after “considering” the advisory federal sentencing guidelines as 
required by Booker, are then relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the federal 
statute allowing broad latitude in selecting relevant sentencing criteria, 
even where that criteria directly contradicts a policy decision made by 
the Commissioners.   
For example, some judges are lowering sentences based upon a 
defendant’s need for medical care, despite the Commissioners’ rejection 
of this factor.  In United States v. Jones,152 Judge Brock Hornby sentenced 
a mentally impaired defendant to probation rather than the twelve to 
eighteen months “recommended” by the federal sentencing guideline for 
his weapon’s possession offense.  In employing his discretion to reject 
this range, the judge pointed to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D), which provides 
that one sentencing factor is “to provide the defendant with needed . . . 
medical care . . .”153  For Mr. Jones, that was best done by allowing him 
to continue to live with his sister and take his various medications.  
Judge Hornby further noted that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) provides that 
another sentencing factor is to “protect the public from further crimes of 
the defendant,” which again was best accomplished by allowing the 
defendant to continue his treatment program, rather than by disrupting 
it by a prison term.154  The judge pointedly noted that his sentence would 
have been impossible before Booker because neither mental and 
emotional conditions, diminished capacity, nor efforts toward 
                                              
judges to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) by giving specific reasons for sentences that vary from 
the guideline range.  Id. 
151 In addition to the cases discussed infra notes 152-172, instances of district judges sentencing 
quite differently from what the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual “advises” include United 
States v. Myers, 353 F. Supp. 2d. 1026, 1028 (S.D. Iowa 2005) (“[T]he Guidelines are not 
presumptive, but advisory, and should be treated as one factor to be considered in conjunction 
with other factors that Congress enumerated in section 3553(a).”); see also United States v. Kelley, 
355 F. Supp. 2d. 1031, 1034 (D. Neb., 2005) (“Post Booker, the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) 
requires a sentencing court to regard the Guidelines ranges as one of many factors.”); United 
States v. Huerta-Rodriguez, 355 F. Supp. 2d. 1019, 1023 (D. Neb. 2005); Feds Want Dearborn 
Heights Man to Be Imprisoned in Porn Case, DETROIT NEWS, March 20, 2005, available at 
http://www.detnews.com/metro/0503/20/B06-122080.htm (reporting government’s appeals 
of District Judge Friedman’s post-Booker sentence of defendant LaFrank’s probation in 
pornography case, where guidelines called for sixty-three months prison time, and reporting 
that in about 10% of sentencings, federal judges in Detroit had given sentences lower than called 
for by the guidelines). 
 A very thorough and current list of all post-Booker federal decisions was prepared by 
Frances H. Pratt for the Office of the Federal Public Defender in Alexandra, VA, and can be 
found at http://sentencing.typepad.com. 
152 352 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D. Maine 2005). 
153 Id. at 26. 
154 Id. 
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rehabilitation would have entitled the defendant to a downward 
departure.155 
Other judges are decreasing sentences, as Judge Hornby did, in part 
based upon rehabilitation concerns.  For example, Chief Judge Ezra of 
Hawaii used treatment concerns to justify a reduced sentence for a first 
time offender who had undergone sex-offender treatment after his 
conviction for downloading child pornography.156  Similarly, Judge 
Arcara of New York reduced the sentence of a first-time non-violent 
offender based upon rehabilitation potential.157  
More than a few judges are using their discretion to close the 100:1 
crack to powder cocaine disparity in sentencing.  Congress enshrined a 
100:1 ratio into law in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1985, such that to 
trigger the Act’s ten-year mandatory minimum sentence, the offense had 
to either involve five kilograms of powder cocaine or a mere fifty grams 
of crack.158  Numerous state jurists and academics have decried the 
disparate racial impact this penalty scheme imposes, as African-
Americans account for 90% of federal crack cocaine defendants.159  The 
Commission, initially with the blessing of the Clinton Department of 
Justice, has thrice tried to modify this ratio, but Congress has rebuffed 
these attempts.160  Thus, federal judges, who had their hands tied until 
                     
155 Id. at 23-24 (discussing Guideline § 5H1.3, providing that “mental and emotional 
conditions are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted,” 
§ 5K2.13, which provides for a downward departure for reduced mental capacity only where it 
contributed to the commission of the offense, § 5K2.19, which prohibits departures for post-
sentencing rehabilitative efforts but makes no mention of pre-sentencing efforts, and § 5K2.0, a 
catchall departure guideline, which was inapplicable). 
156 See Sentencing Law and Policy (Jan. 20, 2005), at http://sentencing.typepad.com/ 
sentencing_law_and_policy/2005/week3/index.html. This informative blog is managed by 
Professor Doug Berman from Ohio State. 
157 Id. 
158 Pub. L. No. 99-570. 100 Stat. 3207 (1986); codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2000). 
159 United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev’d 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994); 
Kevin J. Cloherty & Dawn M. Perlman, Powder vs Crack:  100 to 1 Current Quantity Ratio Under 
Attack, 50 FED. LAW. 50 (2003); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 1283, 1308-09 (1995) (concluding that equal protection analysis should be loosened to 
account for unconscious racism, especially where a criminal prohibition has a seriously 
disproportionate impact on back defendants).  In 1994, blacks comprised 90.4% of all federal 
crack cocaine drug offenders.  United States v. Smith, 73 F.3d 1414 (6th Cir. 1994) (Jones, J., 
concurring).  In 1993, only 4% of federal crack cocaine offenders were white, and 88% of such 
defendants were black.  United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 478 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (citing to U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:  COCAINE AND 
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 39, 161 (Feb. 1995)). 
160 On May 11, 1995, the Commission presented an amendment to Congress recommending 
that the 100:1 ratio be replaced with a 1:1 ratio equivalence between crack and powder cocaine. 
60 Fed. Reg. 25,074 (1995).  In 1997, the Commission recommended altering the penalties to 
reflect a 5:1 ratio, on July 3, 1997, the Attorney General recommended adopting a similar 5:1 
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Booker, are now imposing crack cocaine sentences below that formerly 
required by the Guidelines.161  Similarly, some judges are availing 
themselves of the opportunity to reject what they consider draconian 
drug sentences for low-level “mules,” as the Guidelines base the penalty 
upon the actual quantity of the drug possessed or that is the subject of 
the conspiracy, regardless of whether a particular defendant knew the 
quantity involved or was aware of the full scope of the conspiracy.162   
In another category of cases, judges who disagree with various 
aspects of the Commissioners’ policy choices regarding fraud sentences 
have used Booker as a means of voicing this disagreement.  In United 
States v. Ranum,163 Judge Adelman sentenced a loan officer convicted of 
misapplying bank funds to a year and a day in prison, rather than the 
recommended guideline range of thirty-sevent to forty-six months.164  
Post-Booker, he “may no longer uncritically apply the guidelines” but 
must instead “consider all of the § 3353(a) factors, not just the 
                                              
ratio, and on July 22, 1997, the Clinton Administration publicly proposed reducing the ratio to 
10:1.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 2 (1997).  The text of the proposed amendments to the guidelines are 
reprinted at Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Policy Statements and Official 
Commentary, 57 CRIM. L. REP. 2095, 2096 (1995).  Congress refused to introduce a bill to 
implement any of these solutions.  In 2002, the Commission again declared the 100:1 ratio 
“unjustified.”  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  COCAINE AND 
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY viii (May 2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/LEGIST.htm.  
Congress again refused to act.  See Elizabeth Tison, Amending the Sentencing Guidelines for Cocaine 
Offenses, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 413, 429 (2003). 
161 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, No. 02-CR-163, 2005 WL 549057 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (Judge 
Adelman) (granting below guideline sentence to defendant convicted of crack offense); United 
States v. Simon, No. CR-90-216CPS, 2005 WL 711916 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (Judge Sifton) (holding that 
post-Booker courts do not have to follow the 100:1 crack to powder ratio, and sentencing 
defendant to 262 months rather than the guideline recommended 324-405 months); United 
States v. Thomas, No. 03-CR-30033-MAP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3972 (D. Mass. 2005) (Judge 
Ponsor); United States v. Harris, No. 04-0157, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3958 (D.D.C. 2005) (Judge 
Robinson); United States v. Carvajal, No. 04 CR 222AKH, 2005 WL 476125 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); 
United States v. Nellum, No. 2:04-CR-30, 2005 WL 300073, at *3 (N.D. Ind. 2005). 
162 U.S. District Judge Arcara in Buffalo gave a one day sentence to a female drug mule rather 
than imposing the Guideline range of twenty-four to thirty months.  Dan Herbeck, Thanks to 
High Court, Drug Defendant Gets 2nd Chance, THE BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 20, 2005, at B1. 
163 United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d. 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005). 
164 Judge Adelman asserted that pursuant to Booker, he must impose a sentence “sufficient but 
not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set forth” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Id. at 
985.  Thus, he must consider the nature of the offender, the nature of the offense, the need to 
avoid unwarranted disparities, the kind of sentences available, and the needs of the public and 
victim.  He “may no longer uncritically apply the guidelines and, as one court suggested, ‘only 
depart . . .in unusual cases for clearly identified and persuasive reasons.’“  Id.  Judge Adelman is 
convinced that the latter quoted approach, espoused by Judge Paul Cassell in United States v. 
Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d. 1269 (D. Utah 2005), is “inconsistent with the holdings of the merits 
majority of Booker.”  Id. 
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guidelines.”165  In Mr. Ranum’s case, the victims will be more likely to 
receive restitution (as provided for by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7)) if the 
period of imprisonment is short and the defendant can get back to work. 
 Most importantly, the defendant’s offense level under the advisory 
guidelines was largely the product of the loss amount.  Judge Adelman 
disagrees with this guideline choice in white-collar cases, preferring to 
assess “personal culpability,” which may or may not correspond to loss 
amount depending upon “the nature of the case.”166  In Ranum’s case, 
the “defendant’s culpability was mitigated in that he did not act for 
personal gain or for improper personal gain of another” but rather made 
a series of reckless loans which went bad.167  That, coupled with the 
defendant’s solid employment history, his need to raise his daughters, 
and his need to care for his elderly depressed mother and Alzheimer’s 
ridden father, supported the low sentence.  Likewise, former 
Connecticut Governor John Rowland received only a year and a day in 
prison for his plea to conspiracy to steal honest service, despite a 
Guideline range of fifteen to twenty-one months, and a prosecutorial 
recommendation of thirty to thirty-seven months.168 
At least some judges appear to be granting larger § 5K1.1 substantial 
assistance departures than requested by the government.  For example, 
Judge Presnell in United States v. Bevlett169 rejected the “government’s 
philosophically one-sided bid to marginalize the judicial branch” by 
controlling the amount of downward departures, finding instead that 
judicial control over substantial assistance departures would better serve 
the goal of eliminating sentencing disparity.170  Thus, Judge Presnell 
granted the defendant a five-level departure for cooperation with the 
authorities (Mr. Blevett immediately told the government who gave him 
the kilogram of powder cocaine he tried to smuggle from Jamaica to 
Florida), despite the government’s request for only a two-level departure 
(because the crew member who had given the drugs to the defendant 
                     
165 Id. at 985-86 (emphasis in original). 
166 Id. at 990. 
167 Id. 
168 William Yardly & Stacey Stowe, A Contrite Rowland Gets a Year for Accepting $107,000 in 
Gifts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, at A.3.  Thus, Judge Dorsey either granted a downward 
departure under the Guidelines or a Booker variance, but because the opinion is not published it 
is impossible to say which one.  The extra day was to the defendant’s benefit, as he is eligible for 
the 15% “good time” reduction only if his sentence is over one year. 
169 No. 6:04-cr-199-Orl-31DAB (M.D. Fla. 2005), at http://sentencing.typepad.com/ 
sentencing_law_and_policy/files/judge_presnell_belvett_sentencing_opinion.pdf. 
170 Id.  This is because cooperation agreements allow more culpable defendants to receive 
shorter sentences than less culpable ones, and because there is much disparity among districts in 
the application of § 5K1.1.  Id. at 4 (citing Am. College of Trial Lawyers Report and Proposal on 
§ 5K1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503, 1524-25 (2001)). 
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had already absconded).171  The Commentary to § 5K1.1 provides that 
“substantial weight should be given to the government’s evaluation of 
the extent of the defendant’s assistance,”172 and, prior to Booker, it was a 
matter of course for the court to grant whatever decrease the 
government suggested. 
Recent cases also show that a few judges are using their new found 
discretion to increase sentences in particularly egregious cases, beyond 
what the former mandatory federal sentencing guidelines would 
allow.173  For example. Mr. Negron-Cabrera was sentenced to 114 
months imprisonment for assaulting his wife with a deadly weapon, 
though his Guideline range was forty-six to fifty-seven months.174  Judge 
Minaldi of Port Charles, Louisiana, did not believe that the Guidelines 
sentence accounted for the seriousness of the assault, during which the 
defendant threatened to kill the victim and held her hostage for over two 
hours.  In New Jersey, U.S. District Judge Cavanaugh sentenced a former 
federal immigration inspector to seven and one-half years in prison for 
smuggling, more than two years longer than the fifty-one to seventy-one 
months under the guidelines and a harsher term than even the 
prosecutors recommended.175 
Not all judges are treating the Guidelines so cavalierly.  A few 
judges, like Judge Paul Cassell in Utah, have publicly embraced the 
position that they will sentence defendants to the same term they would 
                     
171 Judge Presnell seemed less than thrilled with the government’s argument that anything 
outside the guidelines range is per se unreasonable and that he would be put in a Booker report 
(referring to the Department’s policy of placing judges who sentence below guidelines 
minimums or government-approved downward departures on a “Booker Sentencing Report 
Form,” as described in a memorandum from James P. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. 
Dept. of Justice, Department Policies and Procedures Concerning Sentencing (Jan. 28, 2005), at 
http://www.nysacdl.org/aa/documents/MouthpieceMarch2005WEB.pdf. 
172 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 5K1.1, comment n.3 (2004). 
173 See, e.g., Former Militia Member Sentenced, available at http://www.cadillacnews.com/ 
articles/2005/03/25/news/news01.txt (Mar. 25, 2005) (noting that Judge Quist sentenced 
Norman David Sommerville in Grand Rapids, Michigan, to eighty months for possession of a 
machinegun, despite the fifty-one to sixty-three month sentence recommended by the 
Guidelines); John P. Martin, Janiszewski Gets Stiffest Penalty Despite Calls for Lenience, NEW JERSEY 
STAR-LEDGER, available at http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/index.ssf?/base/news-21/ 
111172998090850.xml (Mar. 25, 2005) (noting Judge Pisano’s forty-one-month sentence for 
Robert Janiszewski in New Jersey for taking bribes, despite the prosecutor’s request for a lighter 
sentence due to the defendant’s assistance as a cooperating witness in numerous other cases). 
174 Negron-Cabrera Sentenced to Over Nine Years in Prison, LEESVILLE DAILY LEADER, available at 
http://www.leesvilledailyleader.com/articles/2005/03/23/news/news4.txt (Mar. 23, 2005). 
175 John P. Martin, Irate Judge Throws Book at Smuggler, THE STAR LEDGER available at 
http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/jersey/index.ssf?/base/news-9/1111561194122990.xml 
(Mar. 25, 2005).  The prosecution recommended the lighter term due to defendant’s cooperation. 
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have received if the Guidelines were mandatory.176  Judge Cassell 
opined that trial judges should give “considerable weight” to the 
Guidelines in determining post-Booker sentences,177 and thus he 
sentenced Mr. Wilson to 188 months in prison for armed bank robbery, 
in conformity with the guideline recommended range of 188-235 months 
in prison.   
The U.S. Sentencing Commission has recently begun to collect 
information on post-Booker sentences, and a comparison of their new 
data with data from previous years confirms my suspicions that federal 
district judges will not be shy about using their new-found authority.  A 
chart showing all reported decisions between January 12 and March 15, 
2005 shows that only 62.1% of the over five-thousand cases were within 
the Guidelines range.178  This is a marked decrease over the 71% of 
sentences that conformed to the Guidelines in 1995 and the 65% in 
2002.179  These statistics support the proposition that judges are willing 
to disregard the guidelines under the new system.  The U.S. Sentencing 
Commission chart further shows that 1% of the 1.9% above guideline 
range sentences are directly attributable to Booker.180  The 1.9% figure 
itself is a marked increase over the .9% above Guideline range sentences 
in 1995 and the .8% in 2002.  Judges apparently feel free to give higher as 
well as lower sentences than those required by the old mandatory 
guideline regime.  More significantly, 36% of post-Booker sentences are 
below the Guidelines range—larger than any other year between 1995 
and 2002.181  Of those lower-range sentences, 8.6% are directly 
attributable to Booker.182 
                     
176 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d. 1269, 1270 (D. Utah 2005) (holding that 
the recommended Guidelines sentence should receive considerable weight); United States v. 
Duran, No. 2:04-CR-00396-PGC, 2005 WL 395439 (D. Utah 2005); United States v. Wanning, 354 
F. Supp. 2d. 1056 (D. Neb. 2005); see also United States v. Peach, 356 F. Supp. 2d. 1018, 1021 
(D.N.D. 2005) (“This Court is of the opinion that the proper methodology for sentencing in the 
post-Booker environment is that federal district courts should give the Sentencing Guidelines 
‘substantial weight.’”). 
177 Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d. at 1271 (emphasis not in original, and likewise not in the Supreme 
Court’s command in the Booker case). 
178 Memorandum from the Office of Policy Analysis to Judge Hinojosa, Chair of the USSC 
(Mar. 22, 2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/Booker_032205.pdf (last visited Apr. 
17, 2005). 
179 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS REPORT FOR FISCAL YEARS 
1995–2002, TABLE 8. 
180 The other .9% were classified as an upward departure from the guideline range. 
181 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 179. 
182 Id.  The Commission report noted that this figure is reached by subtracting those below-
range sentences due to substantial assistance and fast track government motions, and 
subtracting those where the judge classified the sentences as a “downward departure.”  The 
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Once a federal district judge sentences below a formerly mandatory 
guideline range, there is not much the prosecutor can do about it.  
Appellate courts are, for the most part, affirming post-Booker sentences 
as “reasonable.”183  So long as the district judge calculated the guidelines 
range and “considered” it, she need not give that factor any greater 
weight than any other factor that the court is instructed to consider by 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).184  Reversals, thus far, seem to be instances where the 
district court miscalculated the guidelines range.185  I anticipate that 
sentences within the federal sentencing guidelines range will be 
“presumptively reasonable.”  This will decrease the appellate workload 
and is consistent with the demand from the Supreme Court that the 
guidelines be “considered.”  On the other hand, I doubt an appellate 
court could impose a “presumptively unreasonable” label to sentences 
outside the guidelines, as this would transform the guidelines into a de 
facto mandatory sentence.186 
When will a sentence outside the Guideline range be 
“unreasonable”?  My guess is essentially never, so long as the judge 
calculated, considered, and rejected the guideline sentence in favor of a 
competing factor from 18 U.S.C.§ 3553(a), and so long as the sentence is 
                                              
remaining 8.6% either cite no reason or cite United States v. Booker or 18 U.S.C. § 3553 as the 
reason for the low sentence. 
183 “We review the sentence imposed for unreasonableness, judging it with regard to the 
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United States v. Killgo, 397 F.3d. 628, 630 (8th Cir.  2005); United 
States v. Cramer, 396 F.3d 960, 965 (8th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Yahnke, 395 F.3d 823, 
824 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The courts of appeals review sentencing decision for unreasonableness.”); 
United States v. Hughes, No. 03-4172, 2005 WL 628224 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that trial judges 
should still consider the Guideline range under § 3553(a)(4) as well as all other factors set forth 
in § 3553(a), and the judge is required to state his reason for sentencing outside the guidelines 
under § 3553(c)(2), and an appellate court will affirm any sentence within statutory maximum 
that is “reasonable”).  But see United States v. Rogers, 400 F.3d 640 (8th Cir. 2005); infra note 188. 
184 District courts adopting this position include Simon v. United States, CR-90-216CPS, 2005 
WL 711916 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that § 3553(a), which includes the calculation of the 
guidelines range in (a)(4), does not distinguish between the weight to be given to any of the 
factors listed); United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (giving “heavy 
weight” to the Guidelines may be in conflict with sections 3553(a)’s command to consider a 
multitude of factors); United States v. Biheiri, 356 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. Va. 2005); United States 
v. Huerta-Rodriguez, 355 F. Supp. 2d. 1019 (D. Neb. 2005); United States v. Myers, 353 F. Supp. 
2d 1026 (S.D. Iowa 2005). 
185 See, e.g., United States v. Villegas, No. 03-21220, 2005 WL 627963 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that 
where the trial court sentences under the guidelines, the appellate court will review de novo 
whether it properly interpreted and applied the Guidelines, but where the district court 
exercises its post-Booker discretion to impose a non-guidelines sentence, the review will be under 
the new reasonableness standard). 
186  See Simon, 2005 WL 711916, at *4 (“[T]he greater the weight given to the Guidelines, the 
closer the court draws to committing the act that Booker forbids—a Guidelines sentence based on 
facts found by a preponderance of the evidence by a judge.”); see also Biheiri, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 
595. 
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within the statutory minimum and maximum penalty.  A judge would 
need to act irrationally or with invidious discrimination before 
entertaining a realistic fear of reversal on appeal.  As Justice Scalia so 
astutely noted in his Booker dissent, there is simply no benchmark for 
reasonability beyond what Congress prescribes as the statutory 
maximum.  Just as there was no judicial review of sentences before the 
SRA, I predict that eventually, after the kinks are worked out, there will 
be no meaningful review of sentencing post-Booker.187  
It is possible, however, that appellate courts may develop an 
enforceable federal law of sentencing through appellate opinions.  In the 
first published circuit court opinion applying the reasonableness 
standard of review, the court reversed a sentence of probation for the 
offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm as unreasonable in 
light of the sentencing factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  In United 
States v. Rogers,188 the trial judge had considered the fifty-one to sixty-
three month sentence recommended by the Guidelines and departed 
downward on the bases of extraordinary rehabilitation—the defendant, 
though deer hunting while on parole in a state drug case, had managed 
to stay off drugs and had reunited with his family.  The Eighth Circuit, 
though providing no discussion of the nature of the reasonableness 
standard or how it should be applied in other cases, opined that the 
sentence was unreasonably low in light of the defendant’s criminal 
history and congressional direction to protect the public and deter 
defendants with a similar record.  Should the courts continue in this vein 
and develop set ranges for certain offenses based upon particular facts 
(such as whether the defendant demonstrated respect for the law or 
admitted acts of drug use)189 these facts may well become elements of 
greater offenses under Booker.  If so, defendants will argue that it violates 
the Sixth Amendment to allow judicial fact-finding on these matters.  
The government will argue that these factors are not based upon 
legislative enactments (a requirement in Blakely and Booker) but upon a 
judicially created common law of sentencing that is exempt from the jury 
requirement.  While a similar argument (that the guidelines were not 
legislative enactments because they were promulgated by the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, an administrative body located in the judicial 
                     
187 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (noting that judge could raise defendant’s 
sentence from the life imprisonment recommended by the jury to death based upon his 
conclusion at sentencing that Mr. Williams possessed “a morbid sexuality” and was a “menace 
to society,” and may consider any information he chooses to at sentencing).  While there was 
reasonability review under the SRA prior to Booker, this was only for the length of departures 
and for the few instances where there was no guideline established for a crime.  That review 
functioned only because there was a mandatory guidelines system as a backdrop. 
188 400 F.3d. 640 (8th Cir. 2005). 
189 Id. at 642. 
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branch) failed in Booker, the disconnect between the sentence and the 
legislative enactment (here the sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)) is stronger.  
What are we to make of this data?  For those who believe that the 
primary purpose animating the Guidelines is uniformity, we probably 
already have sufficient date to conclude that Justice Breyer’s experiment 
is failing.  For those who desire improved uniformity over the pre-1984 
days, yet long for some judicial discretion to account for unusual cases, 
and especially for those who believe prosecutors possessed excessive 
power under the Guidelines, the experiment is somewhat of a success. 
III.  PLEA BARGAINING AFTER BOOKER  
Most post-Booker sentencing, like most pre-Booker sentencing, will be 
based not upon jury trials but upon plea-agreements.  The interesting 
post-Booker questions are whether the total percentage of guilty pleas 
will decrease, whether plea deals will get sweeter for defendants, and 
whether judges will have any more input into sentencing after accepting 
a guilty plea.  My guess is that the answer to all of these questions will 
be in the affirmative. 
The federal criminal justice system, as presently constructed, relies 
on the upward of 93% of defendants pleading guilty and waiving their 
right to a jury trial.190  The overall plea rate must remain relatively 
constant—pressures from judges, prosecutors offices, and prison 
systems will ensure that this continues.191  What can change, however, is 
the structure and outcome of the plea negotiations. 
Prosecutors, who controlled the show pre-Booker through a 
combination of charge and fact bargaining, offering downward 
departures based upon substantial assistance, agreeing to acceptance of 
responsibility adjustments, and threatening mandatory minimum and 
consecutive sentences,192 will do everything in their power to replicate 
                     
190 In 1998, 93.6% of federal defendants pled guilty.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig. C (3d ed. 1998), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1998/Sbtoc98.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005). 
191 Most scholars agree that resource and time constraints on the part of prosecutors, courts, 
and prison systems demand that the plea rate remain constant or decrease.  See, e.g., SARA SUN 
BEALE & NORMAN ABRAMS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 748 (3d ed. 2000) 
(“In order to keep the system from grinding to a halt, the Guidelines had to accommodate, and 
even encourage, plea bargaining.”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.1 (2d 
ed. 1999); Fisher, supra note 21; Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 
101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992). 
192 See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 141 (noting that “the exercise of broad 
prosecutorial authority over sentencing within a system that severely limits the sentencing discretion 
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this pre-Booker world.  Immediately after Blakely v. Washington was 
rendered, the Department of Justice sent a memorandum to all U.S. 
Attorney’s Offices instructing Assistants to seek to obtain plea 
agreements that waived all rights under Blakely, and included the 
provisions that:  
[T]he defendant agrees to have his sentence determined 
under the Sentencing Guidelines; waives any right to 
have facts that determine his offense level under the 
Guidelines . . . alleged in an indictment and found by a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt, agrees that facts that 
determine the offense level will be found by the court at 
sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence and that 
the court may consider any reliable evidence, including 
hearsay; and agrees to waive all constitutional 
challenges.193 
Now prosecutors can instead ask for Booker waivers.  They will attempt 
to get defendants to contract into a plea agreement that stipulates that 
the Guidelines are mandatory, or that stipulates to a particular Guideline 
sentence, and that waives the defendant’s right to petition the judge for a 
more lenient sentence.   
There are three types of plea agreements under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11(c):  agreements to dismiss one or more charges 
under 11(c)(1)(A); agreements to make a nonbinding sentencing 
recommendation under 11(c)(1)(B); and agreements for a specific 
sentence under 11(c)(1)(C).194  A pre-Booker regime could be 
accomplished by using these so called 11(c)(1)(C) pleas to a set term of 
years.  Some U.S. Attorney’s Offices have adopted plea policies that 
purport to agree only to those deals that allow the government to 
withdraw if the judge goes below an agreed upon sentence (and allow 
the defendant to withdraw if the judge exceeds the maximum agreed 
upon sentence).  At least some judges in Detroit, Michigan, have refused 
                                              
of federal judges means that the power of prosecutors is not subject to the traditional checks and 
balances that help prevent abuse of that power”) (emphasis in original); Albert W. Alschuler, 
Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power:  A Critique of Recent Proposals for “Fixed” and 
“Presumptive Sentencing,” 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550 (1978); Susan R. Klein, Double Jeopardy’s Demise, 
88 CAL. L. REV. 1001 (2001) (reviewing GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY:  THE HISTORY, 
THE LAW (1998)) (suggesting that prosecutors have inordinate power to charge and sentence in 
part because of the Court’s current interpretation of the double jeopardy clause). 
193 Memorandum from James Comey, Deputy Attorney General, to all Federal Prosecutors, 
Departmental Legal Positions and Policies in Light of Blakely v. Washington at 4 (July 2, 2004), 
available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/dag_blakely_ 
memo_7204.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2005). 
194 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(A)-(C). 
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to accept such plea agreements in their courtrooms.195  While judges 
need not accept such pleas, the incentive of moving cases along will 
drive many jurists to accept them. 
However, even if judges routinely accept such deals, defendants will 
have little incentive to agree to contract back to a pre-Booker world, or to 
agree to a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea containing 
a guideline sentence.  As Nancy King and I argued immediately after the 
Court rendered Apprendi, plea deals will improve for defendants post-
Booker.196  Defendants have most of the new bargaining chips in this new 
system.  Prosecutors realize that many judges think the Guidelines are 
too harsh, especially for white collar and drug cases, so deals should be 
to lower sentences than pre-Booker.  Judges are now free to add the three 
point “acceptance of responsibility” decrease without waiting for a 
government motion to do so, and even further can grant reductions for 
acceptance even if the government refuses to offer a plea agreement.197  
Judges can depart downward or ignore the Guidelines altogether, so 
long as they can articulate a “reason” for doing so. 
I anticipate that we might also see more “open pleas” to indictment, 
and in fact, many of my sources in various U.S. Attorney’s Offices 
confirm that this is occurring.  If the defendant is willing to plead guilty 
but the government refuses to negotiate a deal (because the defendant 
will not agree on a Booker waiver or a particular application of the 
Guidelines), and the defendant wishes to assure that she obtains some 
credit for accepting responsibility and not unnecessarily taking up the 
court’s time, she may wish to plead straight up to the indictment, 
without any formal plea agreement.  Because the Guidelines are not 
mandatory and guideline enhancements are not elements of greater 
offenses after Booker, prosecutors cannot charge the  Guideline 
aggravators in indictments and insist that a defendant plead to the 
greater offense (thereby forcing the judge to enhance a sentence on that 
basis).  These guideline aggravators would constitute surplusage, and 
                     
195 See DETROIT NEWS, supra note 151 (reporting that Alan Gershel, chief of the criminal 
division for the United States Attorney’s Office in Detroit, sent a letter to judges explaining its 
new policy, and that some defense lawyers and judges have rejected these arrangements). 
196 King & Klein, Apprendi and Plea Bargaining, supra note 77, at 295-306 (Apprendi provides 
new elements that prosecutors must prove beyond a reasonable doubt after employing the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, if they want assurances that judges will increase sentences based 
upon those facts). 
197 See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Acceptance of Responsibility and Conspiracy 
Sentences in Drug Prosecutions After Apprendi, 14 FED. SENTENCING REPORTER 165 (2002) 
(suggesting pre-Booker that the Commission amend §3E1.1 to clarify that acceptance points 
are appropriate for defendants whose unambiguous offers to plead guilty to a lesser-
included offense are rejected by the prosecution). 
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defendants could insist that they be stricken.198  This gives the defendant 
the opportunity to convince the judge to a sentence lower than 
recommended by the Guidelines for the charged offense.  There is 
simply no reason to agree to a sentence at the Guideline range or higher 
without anything in exchange. 
However, most defendants will still plead guilty.  While the number 
of statutory enhancements the Supreme Court has left in effect are 
dwindling, a judge probably still cannot sentence below a statutory 
minimum without a government request for substantial assistance, or 
unless the defendant fits within the safety valve provision.  Similarly, a 
defendant cannot get a consecutive sentence count (like a weapons 
offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) dropped without the prosecutor’s 
approval.199  In cases where the government has no large clubs to hold 
over the defendant, there will still be agreements as defendants trade 
trial rights for better plea deals.  After a period of post-Booker sentencing, 
prosecutors and defense attorneys in every district will get a sense of 
how each particular judge sentences, and will bargain in the shadow of 
that expected outcome.  No defendant would sensibly agree to waive 
indictment and plead before his case was drawn out of the wheel and he 
                     
198 In those post-Blakely and pre-Booker jurisdictions that refused to apply Blakely to the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, caselaw held that when prosecutors put federal sentencing 
guidelines facts into indictments, these facts were surplusage and must be stricken.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Brown, No. 00-CR-939, 2004 WL 1879949 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (court granted 
defendant’s motion to strike sentencing allegations from the indictment and forbade the 
government from proving up, either at trial or at a bifurcated sentencing hearing, any 
evidence of obstruction of justice); United States v. Mutchler, 333 F.Supp.2d 828 (S.D. Iowa 
2004) (court granted defendants’ motion to strike four “aggravating factors” from the 
superseding indictment; the court determined that “the aggravating factors are not criminal 
conduct defined by Congress and, as such, have no place within the charging documents 
against the defendants); United States v. Jardine, No. CR.A. 04-219, 2004 WL 2314511 at *4 
(E.D. Penn. 2004) (holding that as additional factors are “not criminal conduct defined by 
Congress,” they “have no place within the charging documents against defendants”). 
 Now that the Booker Court has held that the guidelines are advisory and thus 
guideline facts are not elements of greater offenses to be submitted to juries, caselaw still 
correctly holds that guideline facts are surplusages and must be stricken from indictments.  
See United States v. Cormier, 226 F.R.D. 23 (D.Me 2005) (holding that non-drug-quantity 
“sentencing allegations,” i.e., aggravating factors, in federal narcotics trafficking/weapons 
indictment, including allegations that defendant had brandished firearm while committing 
offense of possessing firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking crime, that firearms used in 
drug trafficking offenses were stolen, and that defendant committed offenses less than two 
years after release from imprisonment on prior sentence, were surplusage subject to strike; 
allegations did not state elements of offenses and were matters only for determination at 
sentencing under advisory Sentencing Guidelines). 
199 Pursuant to the Ashcroft memorandum, Assistants United States Attorneys are not 
supposed to use §924(c)  as a bargaining chip, but are instead instructed to accept pleas 
only to “the most serious readily provable offense.”  Reprinted in 6 FED. SENT. RPTR. 347 
(1994) 
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saw what judge he drew.  Most judges will establish a track-record of 
rewarding those who plea, and a record of which § 3553(a) sentencing 
factors they favor.  Therefore, though there may be more trials in certain 
districts depending upon busyness, I predict that pleas will remain at a 
relatively steady state of equilibrium nationwide.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
As one would expect, federal district and appellate judges and 
Supreme Court Justices are all lobbying for the continuation of the 
advisory guidelines that the Court created in Booker.  The Judicial 
Conference of the United States “urged Congress to take no immediate 
legislative action to alter the federal sentencing system in the wake of the 
Supreme Court ruling limiting the Sentencing Guidelines to an advisory 
role.”200  The Judicial Conference is the principle policy-making body for 
the federal court system, its presiding officer is Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist, and it is further comprised of the chief justices of the thirteen 
courts of appeals and a district judge from each of the twelve geographic 
circuits.  The Conference stated in a March 15, 2005 report that “it would 
oppose legislation that would respond to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in United States. v. Booker/United States. v. Fanfan by raising directly the 
upper limit of each sentencing guideline range or expand the use of 
mandatory minimum sentences.” 201 
Despite this heartfelt recommendation from the bench, we should 
not be surprised to see Congress continue its decades long trend of 
reducing rather than expanding judicial discretion in criminal 
sentencing.202  Congress is unlikely to believe that voluntary guidelines 
will achieve sentencing uniformity or proportionality.  Even if 
unwarranted disparity is held in check by stringent “reasonability” 
review on appeal, Congress will likely believe that only the elected 
legislature is the appropriate institution to make such normative and 
policy judgments as whether rehabilitation is effective, whether a 
defendant’s drug-addiction or veteran status should decrease her 
penalty, and whether a white-collar offense is more or less serious than a 
drug or violent offense.  One simple way Congress could impose 
mandatory guidelines is to enact legislation informing the Court that it 
divined legislative intent incorrectly in Booker.  Of course Congress 
                     
200 See Chief Justice in Good Form, entry date March 15, 2005, last viewed on April 18, 2005, 
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2005/03/Chief_Justice_i. 
html. 
201 News Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Conference Calls Off-Site Security for 
Judges Top Priority (March 15, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/mar05ttb/ 
security/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2005). 
202 See supra notes 33-46. 
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would have to pay the Sixth Amendment price for mandatory 
guidelines—enhancing facts would be submitted to a jury for a beyond a 
reasonable doubt finding.  Congress could “Blakelyize” with the least 
amount of pain by simplifying the Guidelines—retaining only the few 
enhancements most regularly employed.  I suggested in my testimony 
before the U.S. Sentencing Commission that Congress or the 
Commission replace the present 258 box grid (based upon six criminal 
history categories and forty-three offense levels) with ten offense levels, 
retaining the same zero to life spread by increasing the judicial 
discretionary range within each grid from 25 to 40%.203  This shifts some 
fact-finding authority back to juries and retains some judicial discretion.  
Some commentators have gone much further by suggesting a return 
to jury sentencing.204  Some of these scholars call for jury findings of all 
facts leading to any difference in penalty, some suggest that the jury 
actually set the ultimate sentence.  While a few states have chosen jury 
fact finding, and an even smaller subset, like my home state of Texas, 
allow jury sentencing, it is beyond the scope of this paper to explain all 
of the drawbacks associated with this idea.  Suffice it to say here that this 
method of sentencing is highly unlikely to be embraced by Congress, at 
least as a first choice.   
If advisory guidelines turn out to give too much leeway (and I 
believe Congress already considers this the case), and Congress rejects 
jury sentencing or my more modest compromise position, Congress may 
well turn to an updated version of the eighteenth century pure “charge 
offense” or “determinate sentencing.”  Rather than a set sentence for 
every crime, Congress may re-enact most of the Guidelines as 
mandatory minimum penalties.  Judge Cassell, in the first published 
post-Blakely opinion, predicted that Congress might replace “the 
carefully-calibrated Guidelines with a series of flat mandatory minimum 
sentences.”205  Facts triggering mandatory minimum sentencing need not 
be submitted to the jury under Booker, so Congress could cabin judicial 
leniency by mandating judicial fact finding on all former Guideline 
enhancers (now statutory mandatory minima) in this manner.  This 
                     
203 See Klein testimony, U.S. Sentencing Commission, supra note 111. 
204 Rachel E. Bartow, Recharging the Jury:  The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of 
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33 (2003) (recommending jury sentencing); Paul Kirgis, 
The Right to a Jury Decision on Sentencing Facts After Booker:  What the Seventh Amendment Can 
Teach the Sixth Amendment, 39 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (suggesting that the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right in criminal cases match the Seventh Amendment jury right in civil 
cases by requiring a jury decision on all fact questions, regardless of when those questions arise 
in the proceeding). 
205 United States v. Croxsford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1254 (D. Utah 2004). 
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system retains judicial discretion only to increase but never decrease 
sentences.    
In fact, Congress is presently considering a proposal that does just 
that.206  Such a fix is constitutional only so long as the Supreme Court 
refuses to overrule Harris v. United States.207  If Justice Breyer supplied 
the fifth concurring vote in Harris only because he had not yet accepted 
that Apprendi would remain good law, it is possible that there may now 
be enough votes to overrule it.  Those who scoff at the notion of the 
Court overruling a constitutional decision only a few years old should 
stop and consider that such a decision would give federal judges, once 
again, primacy and discretion in criminal sentencing. 
                     
206 See § 12 of HR 1528, “Defending America’s Most Vulnerable:  Safe Access to Drug 
Treatment and Child Protection Act of 2005,” introduced by Rep. James Sensenbrenner 
(transforming the guidelines into a complex series of mandatory minimum penalties by 
prohibiting judges from using enumerated factors to sentence below the guidelines range 
but permitting thirty-six factors which a sentencing judge could consider in sentencing 
above the range). 
207 536 U.S. 545 (2002). Justice Scalia joined three of the four dissenters from Blakely and 
Apprendi, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist, to make up the four-
member plurality in Harris.  Justice Breyer concurred.  See supra notes 86-87. 
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